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ABSTRACT
Direct Democracy and State Legislatures: Does Professionalism Matter?
by
Donald D. Mirjanian
Dr. David Fott, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor o f Political Science 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis seeks to improve our understanding of the relationship between state 
legislative professionalism and direct democracy. Using institutionalist theory as a 
framework, I employ negative binomial regression to measure frequency changes in 
statewide ballot initiatives (1990-2000) as a function of state legislative professionalism. 
I find that increased professionalism is associated with higher levels of ballot initiatives 
appearing on statewide ballots, after controlling for qualification difficulty, interest group 
strength, divided government, and demographic variables.
While the conclusions may not provide insight as to the long-term (or short-term, for 
that matter) quality o f the initiatives or referenda, they do provide insight as to when the 
citizenry is more likely to eschew one fundamental component o f American government 
-  representative democracy -  in favor o f what has quickly become another important 
component of American government -  direct democracy.
Ill
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
This thesis will examine the influence o f state-level legislative professionalism on the 
institution of direct democracy. Although considerable scholarship exists on both the 
subject of state legislatures and direct democracies, a lacuna o f sorts exists in literature 
examining the confluence of these two institutions. Given the prevalence o f direct 
democracy in the American states, as well as the importance o f the state legislature, an 
exploration o f this subject is warranted. This study seeks to further our understanding of 
the relationship between the two institutions by examining the conditions under which 
increased initiative activity takes place. More specifically, this thesis seeks to answer the 
following question: how does legislative professionalism influence the institution of 
direct democracy?
State legislatures have undergone significant changes in the last several decades. 
Considered by one observer to be in earlier generations a “racist, sexist, secretive, boss- 
ruled, malapportioned and uninformed” institution (Ehrenhalt 1992), legislatures o f today 
are often characterized by longer sessions, increases in pay and benefits, increased 
staffing, and modem facilities (Hickock 1992). Wide variations exist in the levels of 
professionalization among states, with some states having a “full-time” legislature, while 
others meet for just a short time every other year. Legislative professionalism has been 
found to be correlated with increased contact with representatives (Squire 1993),
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increases in legislator diversity, decreases in occupational diversity among legislators 
(Squire 1992), and perhaps most importantly for this thesis, increased autonomy in 
initiating policies (Thompson 1986). Legislative professionalism has also been associated 
with higher levels of incumbency reelection (Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman 2000) 
as well as divided government (Fiorina 1994, but see also Squire 1997).
The confluence of state legislatures and direct democracy is natural; the outcomes, 
however, are complex. Simply put, direct democracy is an access point for the citizenry 
(or more likely, interest groups) to circumvent the state legislatures; but Gerber (1996, 
1998) argues that interest groups may propose initiatives simply for the indirect effects 
on the legislature: given the correct circumstances, a group may be able to influence the 
legislature into acting without having to actually have success with their initiatives. 
Overall, state legislatures can be a major source o f policy outcomes in a state, but, given 
the right conditions, state legislatures can also be a major source of policy gridlock.
In its modem form, direct democracy was conceived of as a method by which citizens 
could directly “check” the state legislature (and more specifically, powerful economic 
interests) by placing issues directly on the ballot. In so doing, the founders of this 
movement purposefully created a mechanism by which they could circumvent the very 
stmcture of American government: representative democracy. As the institutions 
formalized, questions emerged about the efficacy and viability of such mechanisms: 
clearly, it could produce results -  but did the mechanism remain tme to the founding 
principles? Nor was this potential paradox unforeseen: as early as 1894, editors of the 
Political Science Quarterly considered the populist rhetoric that was becoming 
widespread, and questioned how the “organization required will differ from that of our 
present ‘machines’” (Burgess 1894, 579).
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Gerber (1999) considered this question directly when she considered the possibility of 
a “populist paradox”: the notion that present-day powerful economic interest groups may 
have co-opted from the electorate the very process that was meant to be an equalizing 
force. She finds that this is not the case: for the most part, wealthy interest groups are 
better able to maintain the status quo rather than alter it. Other scholars agree: Donovan, 
et al (1998) find that in interest-group based competition between broad-based interest 
groups and narrow-interest economic groups (e.g., trial lawyers, insurance companies), 
the broad-based interest groups are more likely to succeed in altering the status quo, 
while the narrow-interest groups are more successful at maintaining it. Though left 
implicit in their arguments, these findings do not preclude a paradox; they simply 
preclude the paradox that was deemed most likely to occur. That is, the ability o f well- 
heeled special interest groups to routinely maintain the status quo against groups wishing 
to change it still represents what could be considered co-opting, though not in the manner 
widely believed.
Original advocates of the process argued that the initiative and referenda process 
would invariably increase turnout levels, as well as result in a better-educated electorate 
(Beard 1912; Haynes 1907; U ’Ren 1907). Recent findings on this subject are mixed. 
Everson (1981) argues that while the initiative process may positively affect turnout in 
special circumstances, a general, long term positive impact is unlikely. Conversely, other 
scholars agree that the presence o f the initiative and referenda increase voter turnout 
levels (Smith, M. 2001; Southwell 2001; Tolbert 2001; Tolbert and Smith, D. 2005), as 
well as the presence of interest groups (Boehmke 2005). Additionally, scholars have 
argued that citizens in direct democracy states have higher levels of political awareness 
and civic abilities than do citizens in noninitiative states (Smith, M. 2002; Tolbert and
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Smith, D. 2005). Policy outcomes have been found to be more responsive (Gerber 1996; 
Matsusaka 2000; but see also Cambreco 1998 and Lascher 1996) to public opinion. 
Finally, direct democracy campaigns have been cited as influencing the overall political 
agenda (Makin 2006; McDonald 2004; Nicholson 2005).
As has been shown, outcomes o f direct democracy may not always be in line with the 
expectations o f the founders. Tax-and-expenditure related initiatives were, and still are 
today, among the most common initiatives appearing on the ballot'; however, in yet 
another unexpected outcome of direct democracy, voters intent on taking matters into 
their own hands and voting directly to lower taxes and constrain spending may have, in 
many cases, lowered the quality of life for the citizens o f their state, including decreased 
education funding and social services (Schrag 1998). At the same time, citizens o f the 
states that have passed tax and expenditure limitations are often subject to increased user 
fees (as well as special-districts), that are not found in non-initiative states (Matsusaka 
1995, 2000; Bowler and Donovan 2004).
Additionally, the relationship between minorities and direct democracy is seemingly 
paradoxical. Modem scholars argue that direct democracy may actually promote majority 
tyranny against minority rights, especially in the cases o f housing and public 
accommodations for racial minorities, school desegregation, gay rights, and English-only 
laws (Gamble 1997). Moreover, in a sort of irony-within-an-irony, non-minorities have 
turned to the initiative process in an effort to actually maintain a status quo that had been 
threatened by minority-led (or influenced) state legislatures (Tolbert and Hero 1998).
 ̂ Tolbert (2001) finds that during the period of 1900-1920, 22% of all initiatives were 
concerned with tax, revenue, or spending; her analysis o f the period of 1980-1996 shows 
that similar initiative types also represented 22% of all initiatives appearing on ballots.
Thus, it is not surprising that the study of direct democracy in America has led to 
some confusing outcomes. The present work attempts to disentangle some of the 
confusion that accompanies the study o f direct democracy by reviewing and evaluating 
the literature from the early part of the century (when the institution was enjoying 
widespread installation) forward in an effort to determine how well the expectations and 
anticipations of the founders of this movement have proven accurate. Using the 
expectations o f the founders of my point o f departure, I seek to evaluate the institution in 
its current state within the context of original expectations. That is, by reviewing the 
salient issues providing motivation to the supporters of direct democracy, as well as the 
arguments in opposition to the process, I propose to realign the arguments over the 
efficacy of the process such that the present state o f direct democracy can be evaluated in 
the terms originally outlined by its founders. These salient issues include the role of 
special-interest groups in the process, the educative effects of direct democracy, and the 
role of the state legislature in providing responsive (and responsible) policies. The 
current role of interest groups in the process, as well as the educative effects, will be 
evaluated based solely on the literature (both past and present) within the discipline; 
however, the final ehapters of this thesis present original quantitative analysis regarding 
perhaps the most salient (and often overlooked) issue in direct democracy: state 
legislative influence. In particular, I undertake an institutionalist analysis of direct 
democracy in America in an effort to answer the following question: what is the influence 
of state legislative professionalism on the frequency and types of initiatives that appear 
on statewide ballots.
Thesis Outline
This introductory chapter has briefly considered the institution of direct 
democracy in America, the notion of legislative professionalism, and in particular, how 
institutionalist theory may be used as a model in explaining the relationship between 
direct democracy, state legislatures, and political actors. The following chapter introduces 
the institutionalist theory and its relevance to the process of direct democracy, and 
concludes by defining the relevant terms used throughout the thesis.
The third chapter focuses on the foundations of direct democracy hy evaluating 
relevant arguments presented by the “founders” o f this institution: the Populists and the 
Progressives. I will also consider some of the more salient issues within the institution of 
direct democracy, as well as the role o f the state legislature in the policymaking process.
The fourth chapter discusses the variables that will populate the statistical model, as 
well as formulates the hypotheses to he tested. In particular, I present a pooled, cross- 
sectional data set consisting of initiatives appearing on statewide ballots from 1990-2000 
to be used in formulating the dependent variable. I also discuss the usefulness o f several 
different indices measuring state legislative professionalism before presenting the most 
beneficial index to the work at hand. Additionally, several important control variables are 
introduced: interest group strength, ballot initiative qualification difficulty, state 
population, state-level gross domestic product, as well as controls for divided 
govermnent, state-level political ideology, and political culture.
The model specified here is created to test two central hypotheses. Drawing on the 
central tenets o f the institutionalist theory, I first hypothesize that increased legislative 
professionalism will result in an increase in the overall number of initiatives appearing on 
statewide ballots. Secondly, I hypothesize that increased state legislative professionalism
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will result in increases among various types of initiatives, such as economic-based 
initiatives, initiatives dealing with social and moral issues, as well as those concerned 
with the governmental process.
The fifth chapter reports the results o f the data analysis. Briefly, support for the 
hypotheses under investigation is found. In particular, I find that increases in legislative 
professionalism are associated with higher levels of ballot initiative activity, even after 
controlling for several relevant variables, such as qualification difficulty and state 
population. However, limited support is found for the notion that increases in legislative 
professionalism are associated with decreased levels of certain types o f initiatives.
The final chapter o f the thesis discusses the results of the statistical analysis within 
the context of the institutionalist theory. In particular, I argue that the institutionalist 
theory suggests that institutions constrain the actions o f political actors, and that the 
notion of institutional dynamism suggests that veto points occur within these institutions. 
Political actors pursue their agenda by exploiting these veto points, and such veto points 
become apparent at different levels o f legislative professionalism across states, and 
especially within the context o f several other variables. I conclude by noting that, 
together, these components serve as explanatory predictors o f direct democracy usage in 
America.
CHAPTER 2
INSTITUTIONALIST THEORY AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
The wide range of policies present on statewide ballots suggests that those seeking to 
change the status quo in any given, area have the process available to them. Further, 
scholars suggest that the use of the initiative is a primary, direct determinant in many 
issues in states that have the initiative process, and because of policy diffusion, it often 
affects policy in states that do not have the process (Bowler and Donovan 1998). 
Moreover, the confluence of state legislatures and interest groups with the institution of 
direct democracy suggests that the structure of each of these institutions affects the other 
in a given political setting. Given the dynamics of the institutions involved, 
institutionalist theory provides an appropriate contextual framework with which to 
evaluate direct democracy in America.
Institutionalist theory has long served as a theoretical explanation within the 
discipline of political science; indeed, scholars have updated the framework to such a 
degree that “new institutionalism” has developed separately from historical 
institutionalism. In their seminal work on institutionalist theory, Thelen and Steinmo 
(1992) stress that institutionalism includes both formal organizations and informal rules 
and procedures that structure conduct.
In general, institutionalists are “interested in the whole range of state and societal 
institutions that shape how political actors define their interests and that structure their
relations of power to other groups” and more specifically, historical institutionalists argue 
that institutions “constrain and refract politics but they are never the sole cause of the 
outcome ’’(Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 2). New institutionalism, as the name suggests, is 
similar in many ways in that the focus remains on how institutions themselves shape 
politics, but focuses less on the administrative, legal, and political structures that were 
once studied in a highly normative way and more on the “relational character” of 
institutions, or “how a given institutional configuration shapes political interactions” 
(Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 6).
A significant dilemma regarding historical institutionalism is that the focus is often on 
continuity, and not change. This is due mainly to the structural paradox that exists: while 
the notion o f punctuated equilibrium as a method of change enjoys widespread 
acceptance, Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 6) note that institutions are the independent 
variable in explaining political outcomes in times o f stability, but then become the 
dependent variable predicted by the very political maneuverings they once predicted 
themselves. The authors argue that by focusing on the sources “institutional dynamism,” 
(an integral part o f new institutionalism) researchers will be able to “look at how 
institutions mediate and filter politics [and also] turn the question around to demonstrate 
how the impact of institutions is itself mediated by the broader political context (Thelen 
and Steimno 1992:16).
More specifically, the authors focus on four sources of institutional dynamism: first, 
broad changes in the socioeconomic or political context can produce a situation in which 
previously latent institutions suddenly become salient, with implications for political 
outcomes; secondly, changes in socioeconomic or political balance of power can produce 
a situation in which old institutions are put in service of different ends, as new actors
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come into play who pursue their new goals through existing institutions; third, exogenous 
changes can produce a shift in the goals or strategies being pursued within existing 
institutions: changes in outcomes as old actors adopt new goals within the old 
institutions; and finally, political actors adjust their strategies to accommodate changes in 
the institutions themselves.
Another way of conceptualizing change within the institutionalist framework is 
through the exploration o f “veto points.” In particular, this helps to illustrate the 
relational character of institutions in that the veto points provide “strategic openings” 
(facilitated by institutions) that actors use to achieve their goals. As defined by Thelen 
and Steinmo, “veto points” are areas of institutional vulnerability. The attractiveness of 
institutional vulnerability, particularly for interest groups, is that it presents a sort of 
“chip in the armor” of the policy process, whereby mobilization can effectively influence 
the policy process, whether by modifying the status quo or thwarting new policy 
innovations. Perhaps most importantly, Thelen and Steinmo argue that while veto points 
may be “sticky,” there are not permanent, and shifts in the overall balance of power can 
cause veto points to emerge, disappear, or shift their locations, which in turn provides the 
aforementioned “strategic openings” that actors may use to achieve their goals.
In real terms, the authors argue that this concept explains why similar interest groups 
(conceptualized in terms of organizational power) may have different results in different 
settings. For example, Immergut (1990) analyzes healthcare-based interest groups in 
three countries, and while equally well-organized and powerful, all had varying degrees 
of success. For Immergut, the successful transition to socialized medicine was not 
necessarily the result of successful interest groups in and of themselves (in spite of 
various veto groups) but rather different veto points within political institutions. Such
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conceptualization requires a brief overview o f the notion of change within the 
institutionalist theory.
The adoption o f this theoretical explanation for sub-national research is based mainly 
on its explanatory value in dealing with a multi-institutionalist political arena. Thus, 
considering state legislatures, interest groups, and direct democracy within the 
institutionalist theory appears to be an appropriate fit, especially insofar as the four 
sources o f dynamism are a commonality within the institution of direct democracy. For 
example, the resurgence of direct democracy in the 1970s and 1980s can he attributed to 
broad changes in the socioeconomic (the rise of the anti-tax movement) as well as the 
political context (decreased trust in government due to Watergate); secondly, changes in 
the balance of power o f state governments (as well as interest groups) have produced a 
situation in which old institutions are put in service o f different ends and new actors 
pursue new goals within those institutions (e.g., direct democracy goals of tax and 
expenditure limitations; governance policy issues, such as term limits and campaign- 
fmance reform). Third, exogenous changes have produced a shift in goals or strategies 
pursued hy “old” actors within existing institutions (e.g., the case o f non-minorities using 
direct democracy to maintain the status quo against minority-influenced legislatures, as 
discussed above); and finally, political actors adjust their strategies to accommodate 
changes in the institution themselves, as seen with the discussion regarding the indirect 
influence o f initiatives (led by resourceful interest groups) on state legislatures. Clearly, 
the examples provided here are hut a few o f the many possible ways in which 
institutional dynamism is exemplified by the process of direct democracy. Thus, the 
theory provides a clear foundation for further examination of the institutions o f direct 
democracy, as well as state legislatures.
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Definition of Terms
The terms involved with direct democracy are, for the most part, terms used in 
common parlance, and need little clarification. However, it may be useful to briefly 
define some terms that will be used throughout this thesis, as well as provide a brief 
overview of the current usage of direct democracy in America today.
Direct democracy refers to the process of initiative, referenda, and recall. Though the 
term “direct legislation” is often used interchangeably with “direct democracy,” this term 
refers only to the process of the initiative and referenda, and not the recall. For the 
purposes of this thesis, I use the term direct democracy to refer only to the initiative, 
referenda and recall, though the statistical analysis undertaken here deals only with the 
initiative.
The “initiative” refers the process of proposing a measure for an upcoming ballot, 
after meeting the state-mandated threshold for signatures via petition (which often 
include both quantity and geographic restrictions^), placing a measure on a ballot to be 
voted on by the people in a regular election. Initiatives take four forms; the direct 
constitutional amendment initiative, the indirect constitutional amendment initiative, the 
direct statute initiative, and the indirect statute initiative. In the cases of either the direct 
constitutional amendment or the direct statute initiative, the proposal is placed directly 
(without any action by the state legislature) on the ballot for approval or rejection after 
successfully meeting the signature requirements of the state. In the cases of the indirect 
options, the measures are (after meeting the mandated signature requirements) submitted
 ̂ Quantity restrictions generally refer to a threshold based upon a certain percentage of 
the voters in the last general election; geographic restrictions generally refer to the 
requirement that the signatures come from a certain percentage of counties or districts 
within a given state. This will be fully developed in later chapters.
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to a regular state legislative session prior to going before the voters. If  the state legislature 
does not approve the initiative, the measure is placed on the ballot in the next election; 
additionally, the state legislature may offer a substitute proposal on the same subject 
(Magelby 1984).
The “referendum” refers to the process in which citizens may accept or reject laws 
proposed by the state legislature. There are two types o f referendum; the popular 
referendum and the legislative referendum. In the former, citizens must gather the state- 
mandated number of signatures on a petition in order to have the referendum placed on 
the ballot; in the latter, the legislature (or perhaps a government official or agency) places 
the measure directly on the ballot for the people to accept or reject. All states have the 
legislative referendum; in many cases, proposals are required to be submitted to the 
people for approval. However, the popular referendum is only available in twenty-four 
states (Initiative and Referendum Institute, online).
Direct Democracy Usage in America
Currently, twenty-four states have the initiative process (see Table 1.1); o f these, 
eighteen have the constitutional amendment initiative process, and o f those, sixteen use 
the direct method and two use the indirect method. Twenty-one of the twenty-four states 
have only the statutory initiative process available; of those, fourteen use the direct 
method while nine allow the indirect method^ (Initiative and Referendum Institute, 
online).
 ̂ This discrepancy is caused by Washington and Utah, who allow for both the indirect 
and direct statutory initiative process.
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Table 1.1 -  Initiatives, Popular Referendum, and Types of Initiatives Used By States
WEST
In itia tive
Popular
R eferendum
D irect
In itiative
Indirect
In itiative
D irect
A m end m en t
Indirect
A m end m en t
Alaska X X --- X --- ---
Arizona X X X --- X ---
California X X X --- X ---
Colorado X X X --- X ---
Idaho X X X --- --- ---
Montana X X X --- X ---
Nevada X X -— X X ---
Oregon X X X X ---
Utah X X X X --- ---
Washington X X X X --- ---
Wyoming X X --- X --- ---
New Mexico --- X --- --- --- ---
MIDWEST
Arkansas X X X --- X ---
Illinois X --- --- --- X ---
Michigan X X --- r X X ---
Mississippi X — --- --- --- X
Missouri X X X X ---
Nebraska X X X --- X ---
North Dakota X X X --- X ---
Ohio X X --- X X ---
Oklahoma X X X --- X
South Dakota X X X X ---
Kentucky --- X --- --- ---
EAST
Florida X --- --- --- X ---
Maine X X --- X --- ---
Mass X X --- X --- X
Maryland --- X --- — — ---
Total 24 24 14 9 16 2
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Direct democracy has undergone identifiable usage cycles in American history. In the 
early days o f the process, the initiative and referenda were used quite frequently; the first 
full decade between 1911 and 1920 saw 293 initiatives, while just three decades later, 
between 1951-60, usage dropped to just 114 statewide initiatives placed nationwide. 
Scholars argue that the success o f California’s widely popular (and highly touted) 
Proposition 13 in 1978 and Proposition 4 in 1979"̂  were largely responsible for the 
increase in the process (and in particular, in anti-tax proposals) in the next several 
decades.
Iiiitiiitive Use Bv Deciule, 1901-2000
I 450 
I 400
! 350
I
I 300 
I  :50 
! 200 
150
100 
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0 I I I I
Figure 1: Initiative Use By Decade, I90I-2000
" Proposition 13 reduced California local property taxes; Proposition 4 placed 
constitutional restrictions on state spending. Together, they constitute the first of what 
would become many tax-and-expenditure limitations placed on state governments.
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Examination of initiative and referenda from the period of 1992-2004 confirms this. 
O f the 441 initiatives passed in this period, 76 (or 17%) were concerned with taxes; while 
another 26 (6%) were concerned with the governmental process. Term limits constituted 
another 58 (13%), giving the impression that the citizenry was not opposed to the notion 
of placing limits on their state governments (though this notion coincides with the unique 
individualistic culture o f Western states, a topic to be discussed later). Environmental 
reform measures (8%) are also frequently placed on state ballots, as are education (6%) 
and gaming initiatives (7%).
Thus, it is clear that the usage o f direct democracy in America is on the rise. 
However, before examining the influence o f state legislative professionalism on the 
institution o f direct democracy, it may be useful to examine the development of direct 
democracy in America over the past century. Such an examination is the focus of the 
next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century brought tremendous ehanges to the 
American system of government in the form of direct democracy. This “founding” of 
direct democracy in America can be considered a function of several components: the 
deleterious effects of the Industrial Revolution on many o f the farmers and ranchers in 
America; the desire on the part of Progressives and Populists to install a mechanism that 
could “check” the powerful hold of special-interest groups over state legislatures; and the 
widely-held desire to improve government by making it “more responsive” to the people 
in general -  which would in turn, the Progressives argued, lead to a more politically 
efficacious citizenry, which would again in turn, lead to a better overall government.
Here I explore the founding of direct democracy in an attempt to elucidate the 
arguments that scholars provided during the infancy of this movement. I begin by briefly 
introducing the Progressive and Populist movements, and the similarities and differences 
between them. A brief overview of the initial installation process in the individual states 
follows. I continue by examining the arguments both in favor o f and in opposition to the 
process, and focus in particular on the salient issues regarding the process that still exist 
today, such as the role of interest groups in the process, the issue of state legislative 
responsiveness, and also the “educative” effects of the process on the citizenry. I then 
examine the arguments of present-day scholars in an effort to determine how well the
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institution has developed within the expectations o f its “founders.” The purpose o f this 
discussion is to equate the important issues of the founding era of direct legislation with 
the important issues of the present-day version of the institution and determine which of 
those have been resolved, which have remained tumultuous, and which have developed 
anew. By understanding the evolution of the issues from the founding through the 
present day, the quantitative analysis that follows in later chapters will be more robust. 
That is, by contextualizing the issues in this manner, we can more fully understand the 
importance o f interest groups, the educative effects o f direct democracy, and the 
influence of the state legislature on the institution of direct democracy.
Populists, Progressives, and the Founding of an Institution 
A useful starting point when considering the founding of almost any American 
institution is the works of the framers of the Constitution. In particular, many scholars 
point to Madison’s arguments against the concept of direct democracy in Federalist 10 
(Polhill 2001; Tolbert, Lowenstein, and Donovan 1998). Clearly, they are relevant: 
Madison argues in the former that a group of individuals, united by common passion or 
interest, can be a serious threat to the interests o f the community as a whole: “ .. .it may be 
concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number 
of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure 
for the mischief o f faction.” The only way to check this, o f course, is via a republic; a 
representative government that “refine[s] and enlarge[s] the public views...under [which] 
the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant 
to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves” (Federalist 10).
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If the Founders set the American “train” on a particular track, then the Populists 
sought to apply the brakes nearly a century later. Convinced that the “train” was in 
perpetual motion and quite clearly on the wrong track, the Populists began in the 1890s to 
propose a series of governmental and social reforms (Cain and Miller 2001; Polhill 
2001). Though vitally important to the development of America, the Industrial 
Revolution was not a prosperous time for all Americans. In particular, farmers, ranchers, 
and laborers, stood to suffer immensely by the commercialization o f agriculture and the 
concentration of capital that became hallmarks o f the period. In the late 1800s, 
disenchanted groups (mainly alliances o f farmers, miners, and laborers) formed the 
People’s (or Populist) Party, favoring governmental ownership o f railroads, elimination 
of monopolies, a graduated income tax, free coinage of silver, an expanded money 
supply, and similar efforts aimed at improving the livelihood o f rural families (Cronin 
1989, 43). With bankers, railroaders, and land speculators in their sights, the Populists 
attempted to enter politics and change the system, as they could envision gaining little 
relief from the two main political parties that they believed were controlled by the 
influence o f railroads, trusts, and monopolies. In 1892, the Populists codified their beliefs 
at their first national convention, where they introduced a platform that called for the 
direct election of senators, limiting the president and vice-president to a single term, and 
most importantly for our purposes, the introduction o f the initiative and referendum 
(Cronin 1989).
That Populism constituted radicalism is not easily refuted; that the Populist Party 
sought minor changes in the governmental system is. Faced with little alternative -  after 
all, the Frontier had been conquered and no longer could individuals just “go West” -  the 
Farmer’s Alliance sought to fight back against both their government and nature. As
19
Barens (2004) points out, a catalyst for the Populist revolt was a drought-fed deflationary 
period beginning in 1887 which saw massive foreclosures resulting from earlier credit 
extensions and speculation-buying. After a decade of misery, it was clear to them that 
big business interests had control of the government, but this was just the start: for 
Populists, “individualism alone was not enough to secure democracy in an industrial era”, 
so they sought governmental intervention to “return authority to the people, in whom they 
had complete faith and trust” (Barens 2004, 54).
The Populist desire to put the elite few who had corrupted the public good back into 
their place was, in their minds, best accomplished by the government; thus, the purpose 
was to seek a redress of grievances and not a revolution. However, the institutionalist 
structure was at the heart of the problem, and they sought to directly supplant state 
legislatures with the initiative and referendum (Barens 2004). In so doing, the Populists 
sought to put the people -  and not the institutions, such as parties and legislatures -  in 
control o f the government, and thereby restore sovereignty to the people. In this way, 
Barens argues, the movement was not so much economically driven, but ideologically 
driven.
The early days o f the Populist Party proved mildly successful. In 1892, Populist 
candidate and Civil War veteran James B. Weaver collected just over eight percent o f the 
popular vote, and twenty-two electoral votes, though well short of the 223 needed to win 
(McKenna 1974). For many, however, the Populist Party agenda was excessive: the push 
for nationalization of industries and thorough overhaul o f the currency, lending, and 
banking structures exceeded the more simplistic notions o f restoring economic
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opportunity^ (Zisk 1987), and by 1896, the party was dissolved. While a platform based 
on mechanisms that would ultimately (and purposefully) increase inflation was in and of 
itself a difficult way to gain widespread support, other factors may have led to their early 
demise. McKenna (1974) argues that “platform ambiguity” was the result o f a lack of 
cohesion, and in particular, the lack o f an identifiable doctrine or ideology that could be 
articulated and defended. However, it was ultimately an 1896 decision to fuse with the 
Democrats by endorsing William Jennings Bryan that proved the fatal mistake. This 
decision, McKenna (1974) argues, led to the destruction o f the Populist Party image of an 
independent party, and with it came the unraveling of many of the reform notions that 
had once defined the Party; indeed, by this time, the Populist Party was focused almost 
exclusively on the “free silver” appendage o f its platform. Bryan’s success in the rural 
West was not enough to carry him to victory, and the Populist Party came to an abrupt 
end.
Because Populism was not an economically motivated movement, but rather an 
ideological movement (Barens 2004), perhaps Riker’s (1988) contribution adds a further 
dimension in understanding the demise o f the party. Riker argues that a fundamental flaw 
with Populism exists within the notion o f a “popular will,” which is singularly 
unattainable. Riker explains that it is unattainable because the only way to determine 
what the people want is through voting, and voting simply tells us which alternative wins 
-  and it cannot be determined that the “winning” choice represents the “popular will” 
more than the losing choice -  and this case remains the same even over time. Moreover,
 ̂ “Opportunity” in this sense refers to the notion o f equality of opportunity, in the sense 
that advantage should be open to all; assessments are made on the basis o f merit, success 
is based generally on being the most qualified, given a fair competition.
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Riker argues that in order for the Populist desire to be realized, the government itself 
must implement the popular will. This, Riker argues, may preclude governments from 
respecting both minority and majority groups, and also leaves open the possibility that the 
institutions that constitute a liberal democracy (e.g., elections, and even constitutions) 
could be ignored in pursuit of a goal determined to be the “true will” of the people (Riker 
1988).
The notions of the Populists did not die with the party; indeed. Populist notions are 
perennial. Indeed, Hicks (1931) argued that while the Populist notion regarding banking 
and currency was often regarded as “lunacy,” the adoption o f the Federal Reserve Board 
system by President Wilson in 1914 showed that the “Populist diagnosis had been 
accepted and the Populist prescription had not been wholly ignored” (Hicks 1931, 23). 
Additionally, the Populist belief that the government should operate private agricultural 
storage locations (so that prices could be stabilized over a longer period of time) was 
realized by the Warehouse Act o f 1916; the Hepburn Act of 1906, the Mann-Elkins Act 
o f 1910 and the Transportation Act o f 1920 all placed the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in a much stronger position to regulate rail transportation (Hicks 1931, 25). 
Central to this thesis, the adoption of the initiative and referenda in over two dozen states 
also supports the notion that while the Populist Party may have been short-lived, the ideas 
within bore fruit for decades to come.
Thus, it seems clear that the Populist Party was in many ways initially responsible 
for direct democracy in America, though the actual reforms did not take place until well 
after the Party’s demise in 1896. As Mowry argues, “ ...without Populism, Progressivism 
could not have existed when it did...the lingering Populist reform spirit in the Midwest 
and the South provided Progressivism with many of the votes necessary for the national
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majority needed for the passage o f its reform measures” (Mowry 1972: 34). Over the next 
several years the Populist platform was refined; while many of the same themes were 
present, the movement was now seemingly more legitimate: “insurgency has ceased to be 
a mere uprising of guerillas: it has become a great, a well-regulated, a self-conscious 
progressive movement” (Baker 1910, 4).
Progressives, like Populists, argued for “fairer distribution of the economic and 
political power of the nation” (Barens 2004, 76), and also believed that many of the 
problems in American life were based on the unchecked growth o f large corporations and 
capital accumulation. Progressives sought to “face squarely the social problems left in 
the wake of the industrial revolution and to solve them with the inventiveness 
characteristic of industrial society” (Resek 1967). The notion that the government should 
take a larger role in protecting the interests o f the people was formed into the progressive 
desire for an enlarged -  and more professional -  bureaucracy; it was in this way, they 
argued, that experienced and responsible professionals could act on behalf o f “the 
people” (Barens 2004).
By and large, the Populism-tumed-Progressivism saw tremendous successes, 
especially with the backing of legitimate political actors, such as Theodore Roosevelt and 
Woodrow Wilson. Significant legislation was passed augmenting the role of government 
in business (especially in the Plains states) and politically, widespread establishment of 
the initiative and referenda, along with the constitutional amendment providing for the 
direct election of senators, became woven into the fabric o f American life, along with an 
institutionalized bureaucracy (Barens 2004). Other scholars argue that “the Progressive 
Era forged a link between theory and practice that had not been evident since the age of
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Jackson...both economic and political reform translated prevalent ideas into laws and 
institutions” (Mason and Baker 1985, 560).
The Progressive movement as a whole was not without its detractors. The very idea 
of a “progressive movement” was a misnomer to Hollingsworth (1912), who argued that 
the movement towards direct democracy was not progressive, but actually regressive. 
Though his argument implies an understanding that direct democracy and representative 
government would not coexist, but rather, the former was intended to replace the latter, 
Hollingsworth argues that such a movement signified a return to pre-modem conditions, 
methods, and systems, and as such, disregarded the success (and thus, progress) of the 
current constitutional system of government, which Hollingsworth argues evolved from 
the very system that the “progressives” were trying to return to -  and furthermore, had 
evolved from the final downfall of this type of government.
Less convincingly, the author also argues that the movement does not meet the 
threshold that its propagators laid down: that the institution of direct democracy is all- 
inclusive; that it was meant to make the voice of the masses heard. In effect, he argues 
that because it is in the interest of the masses, or the “plain people,” it is effectively a 
class-based movement designed to exclude the “determining or controlling voice on the 
part o f the smaller class who are identified with the large economic interests of the 
country” (Hollingsworth, 1912). He further argues that this is a contradiction to the ideals 
of the American Constitution, which he parenthetically notes applied to the “whole of the 
country’s citizen population.” Missing in his analysis, however, is the notion that at the 
time of his writing, women had yet to be nationally recognized as enfranchised; 
moreover, African Americans had not held that right for very long, and thus “the whole 
o f the population” seems a problematic tema.
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Hollingsworth further argues that for all of the “progressive measures,” (e.g., the 
direct primary, the initiative, and the recall), the electorate is not provided with any new 
politieal power or funetions: it is still limited to -  as it has been under the representative 
system -  voting. The author questions the veracity o f the supporting view that direct 
democracy is an “absolute form of government by the people” insofar as this form of 
government still has individuals who “enact laws, construe them, and administer them” 
and that this power is still delegated, “whether it be aetual or implied” (Hollingsworth 
1912,39).
Improperly named as they may have been, their movement was quite real. Moreover, 
el ear differenees between the Populists and Progressives existed. Mowry (1972) argues 
that “Progressivism differed sharply from Populism in the loeus o f support, in the nature 
of its leadership, and in the amplitude of its ends” (Mowry 1972, 5). In particular. 
Progressives were often focused on urban problems rather than agricultural issues (and 
thus, drew a broader base of support than Populists); the Progressive was more likely to 
eome from an edueated middle-elass family, and the Progressive leaders were, as Mowry 
argues, “most often from an elite class...and often aware o f it” (Mowry 1972). Hofstadter 
(1955) agrees, noting that intellectuals and professionals had profound roles in 
Progressivism. Thus, while the Populists eschewed the two major parties because of 
doubts regarding their efficaey. Progressives often sought ends that were simply 
unrelated to the party platforms -  and often centered on the reform of individual habits 
and morals (Mowry 1972).
Cain and Miller (2001) point out that the differences between the Populists and 
Progressives are both important and rarely analyzed. They argue that the main difference 
between the two is that the Populists sought to undermine representative government
25
completely, while the Progressives sought many o f the same reforms -  such as direct 
democracy -  but in an effort to “liberalize representative government from corrupt 
forces” (Cain and Miller 2001, 36). In other words, the Progressives were well aware of 
the problem of political machines, hardships caused by rapid industrialization efforts, and 
the immutable strengths o f corrupt corporate and partisan interests. However, instead of 
the Populist notion o f a eomplete restrueturing (which would have included substituting 
direct democracy for state legislatures) the Progressives believed not only in the 
importance of, but also the competence of, the state legislatures and sought direct 
democraey as simply as a proeedural supplement to the existing order; it was to be a 
mechanism by which the people eould eheck the influenee of the special interests on the 
state legislatures. Along with direet demoeraey, the direet primary, the direct election of 
senators, and extending suffrage to women would all work together to promote a better 
government (Cain and Miller 2001). Indeed, for many Progressives, the motivation for 
direct democracy lay in the “insulation” o f the administration o f govermnent from 
political forces -  in effeet, leaving the policy choices to the people via direct democracy 
and the administration o f poliey choices to the government (Magelby 1984). Thus, in 
addition to the measures mentioned above, along with merit systems, nonpartisan 
elections, commission plan for local governments, and independent regulatory 
commissions, the initiative, popular referenda and recall would allow the “Progressive 
doctrine of trust in the individual citizen” to overcome economic trusts, monopolies, and 
cartels that mainly worked through politicians, parties, and state legislatures (Magelby 
1984).
This distinction is often overlooked in the literature. Indeed, in other works 
published in the same year, the groups are referred to as the Populist/Progressives (Polhill
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2001). Although Cain and Miller give little backing to their argument, the notion that two 
groups may have wanted to use the initiative for two different purposes makes intuitive 
sense. The notion continues today, and the Cain and Miller framework may provide a 
useful method of categorizing initiatives over and above the traditional “broad based” or 
“narrow-material” methodologies used recently (Donovan, et al 1998; Ernst 2001). 
Clearly, other typologies exist: social, governmental reform, environmental, regulatory, 
etc.; however, these may not capture as clearly as does the Progressive/Populist 
distinction of whether or not the purpose of the initiative is to undermine the 
representative system in place, or to strengthen it via enhanced responsiveness or 
professionalism.
These differences between the Progressives and the Populists, at least in terms of 
their diverging views regarding the role of the state legislatures, may be illustrated by 
considering different types o f initiatives appearing on statewide ballots today. 
Specifically, many initiatives today seek to answer questions regarding policy decisions 
that state legislatures are unable or unwilling to deal with. In this case, depending on how 
the issue is framed, the state legislature is either not fulfilling its mandate, or it is seeking 
the advice o f the people on the subject. In either case, the institution of direct democracy 
is working as a supplement to the legislature, and is well within the Progressive ideals. 
However, in other cases, initiatives seek to alter the governmental process at the 
structural level. Instances in which initiatives restrict the legislative sessions themselves, 
restrict the tax and expenditure levels of state governments, or seek term limits are in a 
sense, seeking not to supplement representative democracy, but to supplant it - a  notion 
much more in line with the Populist legacy. In these cases, the objective is not to assist 
the legislative process; rather, the objective is to fundamentally alter the process. While
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the overall mission is not to remove the legislatures, it is the objective of these initiatives 
to severely constrain and control the process by which state governments function.
The Adoption of Initiative and Referenda in the States 
In 1897, South Dakota became the birthplace of direct democracy in the United 
States with the submission of a constitutional amendment by the state legislature. The 
amendment succinctly stated that while legislative “shall be vested in a bicameral 
legislature”, the people “expressly reserve the right to propose measures...and also the 
right to require that any laws which the legislamre may have enacted shall be submitted 
to a vote of the electors of the state before going into effect” (Beard 1912). The 
amendment allowed both the initiative and the referendum to be invoked with just five 
percent of the qualified electors o f the state, and also stipulated that the governor could 
not exercise veto power over measures that were voted on by the people.
The following year, with support from the Knights of Labor and the Farmers’ 
Alliance, the electors o f South Dakota adopted the process by a vote of 23,876 to 16,483 
(Galbrcath 1912). Just a year later, the Oregon and Utah state legislamrcs followed suit 
by submitting constitutional amendments allowing for both the initiative and referenda, 
with Nevada, Missouri, and Montana all submitting and adopting by 1907.
Many similarities exist between the states that adopted the process between 1898 and 
1912. During that time, only Missouri, Wyoming, and Mississippi^ failed to adopt the 
measure, while twenty other states adopted the initiative, the referenda, or both. While 
the passage rate in South Dakota was only 3-2 (23,816 for, 16,483 against), most other 
states voted overwhelmingly in favor o f the direct democracy. For example, Oregon
' Missouri, Wyoming and Mississippi have all since adopted the initiative and referenda 
process.
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voters affirmed the process by an 11-1 margin; Nebraska surpassed this with a 12-1 
margin (Waters 2003).
The process, however, was not a rubber-stamp mechanism for all states. For 
instance, while Illinois technically adopted the process in 1902, the vote was “advisory” 
only; the legislature was not bound by the vote, and indeed, the legislature did not follow 
through on the people’s mandate. Sixty-eight years later, a constitutional convention 
passed a very limited form of the initiative, and it was approved by the voters by a scant 
57%. Additionally, Delaware voters faced a similar situation, in which they were asked 
by the legislature whether they wanted the initiative and referenda, and an overwhelming 
“yes” vote (17,405 to 2,135) was never followed through on. This occurrence was not 
limited to the early part of the century; indeed, Rhode Island voters faced a similar 
situation in 1996. In Michigan, the initiative and referenda were approved along with the 
1908 Constitution, but signature requirements and cumbersome processes made the 
process almost impossible to use (Beard 1912) and had to be re-approved with less 
restrictive measures in 1913. In Nevada, the initial adoption included only the popular 
referendum in 1905; it would be seven more years before the initiative would be 
approved. Furthermore, Wyoming, Mississippi, and Minnesota voters were unable to 
approve the process because the respective state constitutions required approval by all 
those voting in the election -  not just a majority by all those voting on the individual 
amendment -  and in these eases, “blank” votes counted as “no” votes. (Waters 2003). 
Though Mississippi voters later ratified direet demoeraey (in 1914), Mississippi stands as 
an outlier ease in that it became the only state to have the initiative process at one time
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only to lose it: in 1922, the state supreme court nullified the process on the basis of a 
technicality^ and was not properly reinstated until 1992 (Waters 2003).
After the initial wave of adoptions across the country (though primarily in the West), 
few states adopted the process. Alaska adopted the process as part of its original 
constitution in 1959, though it was limited to statutes (not amendments) and did not 
include the right to make appropriations. In 1968, Wyoming voters adopted the process 
by a large margin (3-1) and Florida followed in 1972 by allowing only the constitutional 
amendment initiative. Flowever, initiative usage in each of these three states has been 
very low: In Wyoming, only six initiatives were on the ballot between 1968 and 2000; in 
Florida, 16 constitutional amendment initiatives appeared between 1972 and 2000, and in 
Alaska, 31 initiatives appeared between 1960 and 2000 (Waters 2003). From 1904 
through 2005, 2,153 statewide measures have been placed on ballots nationwide, and the 
voters have adopted 877 of these for a passage rate of 41%. Sixty percent of these occur 
in just six of the twenty-four states that have the initiative process: Arizona, California, 
Colorado, North Dakota, Oregon and Washington (I and R Institute, Online).
The institution of direct democracy today varies considerably across America 
(Donovan and Bowler 1998; Tolbert, Lowenstein and Bowler, 1998; Lmst 2001). In 
other words, the “gun behind the door” is a little bigger and more powerful in some states 
than in others. The citizen initiative is available for use in 24 states. The first to adopt the 
process was South Dakota in 1898; the most recent was Florida in 1972 (I and R Institute,
 ̂The Court held that because the initiative by statute and initiative by amendment were 
both approved at the same time, the process was unconstitutional. The Court would have 
preferred to see the processes adopted separately; though the legislature could have 
approved two new amendments, it failed to act. (See Power v Robertson, 130 Miss. 188, 
(%So.769).
3 0
online). No state that has had the initiative process has ever retracted it (Ernst 2001). Of 
the 24 states that have the initiative process, 18 allow their state’s constitution to be 
amended via the process, and 21 allow for statutes to be initiated (thus, three states -  
Florida, Illinois, and Mississippi only allow for the process to be used for constitutional 
amendments). Further complicating - but central to - the analysis is the use o f direct and 
indirect processes. 16 o f the 18 states allow the people to directly amend the state 
constitution, while 2 states require the initiative to weave through the legislature first; o f 
the 21 states that allow the statutes to be citizen-based, 14 allow for direct alteration, and 
9 require^ the initiative to be addressed by the legislature first.
Similarly, requirements for placing an initiative on the ballot vary widely. In low- 
threshold states, signature requirements can range from two percent (North Dakota) of 
the total population to three percent (Massachusetts) of the votes cast in the previous 
election; high threshold states may require ten percent of the votes cast in the prior 
election with ten percent of those from a majority of the counties (Utah) to fifteen percent 
o f the vote total from the previous election and gathered from at least two-thirds o f the 
state’s counties (Tolbert, Lowenstein, and Donovan 1998).
State-level differences in the time frames required to gather signatures also varies. 
For example, in 1996, 630,000 signatures needed to be collected in 150 days to have an 
initiative placed on the ballot in California; while in Idaho, only 40,000 signatures were 
needed in a year’s time (Tolbert, Lowenstein, and Donovan 1998). Indeed, the “initiative 
industrial complex” has taken a firm hold in the process; professional signature gatherers 
and professional consultants who coordinate messages and campaigns (Zisk 1987;
 ̂The extra two are due to the use o f both processes in Washington and Utah.
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McCuan, et al 1998; Magelby 1998; Donovan, Bowler and McCuan 2001); however, the 
widespread belief that these individuals have co-opted the process in their own right is 
unfounded (McCuan, et al 1998; Donovan, Bowler and McCuan 2001).
The fundamental differences of direct legislation requirements in the direct 
democracy states may be under-evaluated in the literature. Many studies that evaluate the 
efficacy of an initiative in terms of its po wer to produce a policy in line with the desires 
of the median voter, or in terms of its ability to produce a responsible or responsive 
policy, fail to recognize the core differences that exist in the ability to have an initiative 
placed on the ballot in the first place. Following from the earlier discussion regarding 
time frame and signature gathering requirements, the process o f direct and indirect 
initiatives and amendments should also be considered.
For example, in Nevada, the state constitution mandates that both statutes and 
constitutional amendments are available via the initiative process, but that statutes are an 
indirect process, and amendments are direct (Bowers 2002). A secondary component to 
this is that the legislature meets only biennially^. This means that if  a group decides in 
June 2007 to pursue a statutory initiative, they would need to gather 10% of the registered 
voters signatures in each of Nevada’s 17 counties in a 10-month period^ submit it to the 
2009 legislature, and if they decide not to vote on it, wait until the election of 2010 -  a
 ̂ Ironically, the Nevada Legislature is mandated to meet biennially due to a ballot 
initiative passed by the people in 1960.
 ̂ D u ring  the 2007  session , the N ev ad a  L eg isla tu re  enacted  S B 549, w hich  increased  
signature requirements from 10% of the voters who voted in the previous election in 75% 
of the counties to 10% of the same population in each of the 17 Nevada counties. This 
change was facilitated by a U.S. District Court ruling {Committee to Regulate and 
Control Marijuana v. Heller, No. CV-S-04-0135 (D. Nev., Aug 20, 2004)) that held the 
previous formula to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, as it “applied the same 
formula to counties of varying population” , and thus, the signatures from smaller, rural 
counties carried more weight than the signature from larger counties.
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full 41 months after the initiative process begins. If the same group pursues an 
amendment to the constitution, the state constitution requires that the measure be placed 
on two successive ballots, and thus, while the measure could qualify for the 2008 general 
election, if  it was passed there, it would be required to stand for passage in 2010 as well. 
In neither case would the measure have any chance of passing before three- and-a-half 
years had passed. Conversely, in a state where the direct statute process is available, the 
signatures for the initiative could be gathered in the fall (or theoretically, the spring 
before the election and the measure could be placed on the ballot the very next fall -  less 
than 12 months).
It seems likely that this would affect the mindset of groups attempting to decide 
whether the best course would be an initiative or simply support for candidates who 
would then in turn support their causes. This may have an effect on the outcomes 
described by Donovan, et al, (1998) who outline a basic game theoretic model that pits 
narrow-based groups versus broad-based groups, and also narrow-based groups vs. 
narrow-based groups, and broad-based groups against broad-based groups. For example, 
the authors characterize a narrow-based group as one who may have considerable 
resources (money, access to legal advice, etc) but the benefits they seek are exclusive and 
highly visible (e.g., trial lawyers or tobacco companies). Conversely, a broad-based group 
may not be well organized, it may have few resources, and suffer from basic collective 
action problems: the benefits they seek are often non-divisible (e.g., SieiTa Club, 
consumer groups). Extensive analysis shows that, while moving “second” is generally 
advantageous to either group (this group does not have the initial capital outlays), narrow 
groups are best suited to defend the status quo rather than to attempt to alter it -  often 
contrary to the intuitive beliefs.
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What the authors imply but do not explicitly state is that the process of direct 
democracy as an institution favors those who move last -  since they can oppose with less 
money than those who had to move first. Following from this logic, it seems likely that 
the more difficult the process (in terms o f signature gathering, time constraints, etc.) the 
more money it would cost the supporter, and conversely, the less defensive capabilities 
that supporter would have. Political and institutional structures shape the strategic context 
in which political actors make choices (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Thus, institutional 
rules and procedures would likely structure the process more than the desire for 
generalizable data would allow.
In other words, while California is clearly a bell-weather state in many respects, its 
professional legislature, direct constitutional amendment and statute process make it -  
quite possibly -  an unrepresentative sample of the entire population of direct democracy 
states. The current authors make no claims about the generalizability of their data; 
however, other authors do. It would be more accurate to say that the results are 
generalizable to a state that has similar institutional structures in the process, rather than 
to all of the states. In an attempt to move to this end, an index of some sort should be 
devised that assigns a “degree o f difficulty coefficient” to each state with the direct 
democracy process. It should be additive in nature and consider the signature gathering 
requirements, the professionalization of the legislature, how often it meets, and whether 
the processes are direct or indirect. Banducci (1998) moves towards this but still does not 
consider the differences in ballot qualifications among direct and indirect states. Such an 
index will be discussed in later chapters.
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Salient Issues in the Institution of Direct Democracy
As the Progressive-era reformers moved forward, several primary arguments began 
to synthesize. Indeed, in the middle o f the boom years, scholar C.B. Galbreath (1912) 
offered several thoughts regarding the process: that the process of direct legislation would 
eventually be introduced into almost all state constitutions; that direct legislation would 
never fully replace the representative system (primarily because o f the increasing 
population) and would be used to make “representative government more representative” 
primarily by increasing legislative responsiveness (Galbreath 1912, 29); that the political 
machines that have co-opted state legislatures will have their influence reduced, but that 
the machines will begin to focus on manipulating the people directly; that citizen- 
lawmaking should seek the advice o f professionals, especially in the drafting phase; and 
that the process neither will be the ultimate answer to all governmental problems nor will 
it be predestined to corruptive forces, as many thought (Galbreath 1912).
Oregon state legislator W.S. U ’Ren, an ardent supporter o f direct legislation 
mechanisms and an instrumental figure in that state’s adoption process, evaluated the 
initiative and referenda in Oregon after its first five years. Writing for the American 
Political Science Association, U ’Ren (1907) argued that the process had successfully 
abolished party bosses and political machines, made the debate over prohibition a local 
matter, decreased legislative log-rolling and taxed corporations that had been dodging -  
all by statutes alone. For U ’Ren, direct democracy was a tool available to the people to be 
utilized for minor corrections to the governmental process; clearly, as a state legislator, 
U ’Ren would not argue for the replacement of representative government with direct 
democracy.
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Guthrie (1912) provides further analysis o f the direct legislation process by arguing 
that the rise of parties often precluded individuals from expressing preferences among 
individual policy choices, and that direct democracy helped to overcome this problem by 
allowing people the opportunity to vote directly on issues without having to re-evaluate 
their party loyalty or association. He further argues that the process allowed the people to 
circumvent state legislatures that often did not consider (or could not consider) legislation 
because of special interest influence (or party bosses), and that the special interest 
influence often resulted in laws that were injurious to the people in some fashion or 
another. Moreover, Guthrie argues that because terms o f office had increased 
considerably, the recall (excluding judges) was a necessity; and that the signature 
requirements put in place by all states would preclude government by “popular impulse” 
(Guthrie 1912).
Ford (1912) argues along similar lines, but adds a further dimension: that the 
apparent fervor motivating the introduction o f direct democracy was not a sudden 
occurrence, but rather a continuation o f a “struggle that has been going on ever since this 
country became an independent nation” -  a struggle to bring the views of the people into 
harmony with the outputs of government (Ford 1912, 66). In particular, Ford notes that 
the framers of the American constitution were well aware of the propensity for state-level 
legislative shirking and corruption, and it was for this reason that a movement towards 
national authority was prominent. Thus, Andrew Jackson’s recommendation that the 
president appoint state governors, along with James Madison’s view that the national 
government should have veto power over all acts produced by state governments, was 
reduced influence only because small states would not have such an arrangement. For 
Ford, the initiative and referenda process equalized apportionment by reducing the
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advantage that rural districts maintained (Ford notes that proportional representation was 
uncommon, and that corruption was more common in “country areas”), as well as 
reducing legislative barriers to constitutional amendments. Further, he argued that the 
process of direct legislation overcame the stagnation that often results from the state 
legislative committee system; that more “careful” and precise legislation would result 
from direct democracy because of the lack of special interest influence; and also that the 
recall should not extend to the judicial branch.
Protagonists make a strong argument in favor of direct democracy. The notion that 
an individual may submit their policy preferences for aggregation while remaining 
independent o f party affiliations is clearly desirable. Moreover, having an opportunity to 
circumvent state legislators (though the institution was often initiated by state legislators 
themselves) is appealing to voters in that they are much more likely to have an 
opportunity to weigh in on issues that state legislators would not have dealt with, whether 
it be because special interest groups dominated the agenda, or because other influences 
often bottled legislation up in the myriad of committee systems. However, the process 
was still, at least in some ways, antithetical to the foundations of American governmental 
structures. For many scholars (Peabody 1905; Haynes 1907; Sanborn 1908) the initiative 
and referenda were quite clearly the wrong answer; for them, if the problem was within 
the state legislators, then the people should simply work on electing more effective (and 
presumably, honest) legislators. Moreover, there was little support for the notion that 
simply placing initiatives and referenda on ballots would improve the efficaey o f the 
citizenry on the process; after all, this was the point of specialized, representative 
legislatures: the idea that professionals would (and could) handle the complexities 
involved in state-level lawmaking.
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The following sections outline some of the more salient issues regarding direct 
democracy in both the early days of the process and today. The purpose of this review is 
twofold; first, to undertake a comprehensive review of the extant literature regarding 
direct democracy; and secondly to examine whether the issues today represent the 
expectations of the founders of the process. The consequences of such an evaluation may 
seem simplistic at first glance; however, the implications take on new meaning when 
considering that the purpose of this thesis is to examine the influence of many o f these 
issues on the process o f direct democracy. That is, it may be helpful to understand the 
foundations of the process in order to better evaluate the present-day efficacy of the 
institution of direct democracy.
The Educative Effects of Direct Democracy 
The notion that the institution of direct democracy would serve as a cheek on the 
state legislatures was not the only argument of the Progressives. An important second 
plank was the educative benefit: the idea that the process would enhance citizen 
engagement, political knowledge, and also heighten citizens’ political (internal and 
external) efficacy^ (Gerber 1996; Lascher, Hagen and Rochlin, 1996; Cambreco 1998; 
Smith, M. 2001; Smith and Tolbert 2004). The argument stemmed from the belief that 
because citizens were acting as lawmakers, they would become more engaged in, aware 
of, and knowledgeable about the issues that they, as citizens, were now proposing and 
acting upon. This argument was soon buttressed by Progressives after voter turnout levels
6 Internal efficacy refers to the notion that an individual may have an impact on the 
political process; external efficacy refers to the institutional responsiveness towards 
individuals.
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increased in the three successive elections after Oregon adopted the process in 1902 
(Smith and Tolbert 2004).
Turnout levels in particular were of concern to early scholars as well. Peabody 
(1905) evaluated early returns from South Dakota, Oregon, Missouri, and Massachusetts, 
and while not considering overall turnout levels, argued that the significant drop-off from 
top-ticket races to the initiatives and referenda in these states made it clear that “the 
voters o f three of these states either are satisfied that their legislators are doing their work 
properly...or do not care to take the frouble...to restrain legislative action” (Peabody 
1905, 447). Further analysis on his part reveals that voters are much more likely to 
participate fully when the question at hand is a municipal matter that has immediate 
implications, while more general propositions are left largely unmarked. For Peabody, the 
initiative and referenda were answers to the wrong problem. That is, for those seeking 
political reform, attempting to supplant representative democracy (and ignoring the 
prosperity that it helped bring to America) was an inefficacious route; rather, it is up to 
the people to elect “wise and honest legislators” (Peabody 1905, 455). Sanborn (1908) 
also found turnout to be low in the early days of the process, noting that “in the long run, 
only about one-half o f the voters who go to the polls will take the trouble to vote upon 
laws submitted to them” (Sanborn 1908, 594).
Beard (1912) considered the relatively low levels of voting on initiatives compared 
to the top-ticket races in the early days of the Oregon initiative and referenda process. 
Noting that a criterion of a good law is the “adaptation to social and economic 
environment,” and further that this is not easily aehieved if  a measure is initiated by a 
small group of people and then put into effect by a minority of voters. Beard argues that 
detraetors should not expeet the same levels o f partieipation in constitutional and
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statutory questions as they would for top-ticket races because the nature of the issues is 
such that they may not appeal to the majority o f voters (e.g., a question regarding the 
proper usage of forest areas may be asked in a large urban metropolis simply because 
both areas encompass the state; the question may be mundane or irrelevant to the 
majority o f people); moreover, many states were (at the time o f his writing) considering 
installing a threshold level (e.g., Washington stipulated that in order for an initiative to 
become law, it must receive not only a plurality o f votes, but also that the total votes 
equal at least one-third of the total votes cast at the election). Moreover, Beard argues 
that there is little reason to believe that many o f the measures passed by state legislatures 
would, if  submitted to a popular vote, gamer a plurality o f the vote -  especially given the 
workings o f committee systems, power-structures, and the extensive “logrolling” of 
members (Beard 1912).
Modem research suggests that, at least in some cases, direct democracy does indeed 
increase voter tumout, and while the normative nature o f “a new moral dimension” 
invites further systematic evaluation, there is evidence that the “educative effects” of 
direct democracy are both positive and real. Whether or not direct democracy has been 
able to “revitalize the public sphere” (or whether the public sphere has revitalized direct 
democracy) remains unclear.
In an early study, Everson (1981) found limited support for the notion that direct 
democracy directly increased tumout levels. In an examination of states with the process 
and those without it, Everson finds that tumout is higher in both presidential and off-year 
elections in states with direct democracy compared to those that do not have the process. 
However, when the Southem states are removed from the model, the advantage is 
eliminated, and Everson argues that other factors (e.g., political culture; higher average
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tumout rates in the West) account for the differences between initiative and non-initiative 
states. Thus, Everson concludes that while initiatives may have a positive impact on 
tumout in special circumstances (such as the case of an especially salient initiative), no 
general long-term positive impact can be conclusively identified. These findings directly 
echo earlier findings by Bone and Benedict (1976), who argued that while tumout levels 
remained relatively constant, roll-off (the difference between those voting for top-ticket 
races and those voting for initiatives or referenda) was most significant when the measure 
dealt with complex issues, such as governmental stmcture, or taxation and revenue.
Tolbert, Gmmmel and Smith (2001) consider a similar question but find different 
results. Using pooled time series data for all 50 states over a 26 year period, they find 
support for the notion that direct democracy increases tumout. Like Everson, these 
authors use the percentage of voting age population (VAP - as opposed to the percentage 
of registered voters, VEP) in measuring tumout levels, and they also control for the 
South. They also add a variable that controls for difficulty in registering to vote, as well 
as controls for individual level factors, such as income, education, and race.
Using OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors to allow for variation 
across cross-sectional units, they find that tumout rates are not higher in presidential 
election years in states with direct democracy. However, rates are higher in states that 
have more initiatives on the ballot, even after controlling for state specific variations, and 
this supports Everson in that salient issues (and multiple issues would increase the 
chances of saliency) increase tumout, although Everson had argued that this was the case 
in midterms only. Their study of midterm elections reveal that states with the initiative 
process have higher tumout rates, but the number of initiatives (and their level of 
saliency) need not be as high to achieve the same result that was found in presidential
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elections. The authors contend that the low information nature of midterm elections 
results in a transformation to higher information elections when the initiatives are on the 
ballot.
In a more recent study, Mark Smith (2001) finds that tumout levels in initiative 
states are also affected by the type of election. Smith finds that initiative salience is likely 
to increase tumout levels by almost four percent during midterm elections, but provides 
little catalyst for increased tumout in presidential years. Additionally, increased salience 
is found by other scholars (Southwell and Passo 2001) to increase tumout levels when 
other variables (e.g., candidate races, socioeconomic factors, southem states, and 
partisanship) were controlled for; moreover, these authors argue that the “increased 
costs^” assoeiated with initiatives has no effect on tumout. Although the model appears to 
be well specified, the authors are attempting to explain individual level behavior using 
aggregate level data^, which can prove problematic.'^ A later study incorporated the use of 
surveys to overcome this ecologieal fallacy and better analyze individual data, and the 
authors find that ballot propositions may “increase voter tumout by transforming low- 
information midterm elections into high-information elections”, thus mobilizing voters 
(Smith and Tolbert 2004).
 ̂ The authors extend Downs’ (1957) “expected party differential” theory to ballot 
initiatives, arguing that ballot initiatives further “increase” the cost of voting such that 
voters may choose to abstain from voting due to the “prohibitive information costs” in 
much the same way that Downs argued that voters would, at some point, reach a 
threshold at w h ich  “d eterm in in g  p arty  d iffe ren tia l b eco m es essen tia lly  p ro h ib itiv e” 
(Southwell and Passo 2001, 276)
 ̂ This limitation has been noted by the authors; however, it is neither explained nor 
justified.
 ̂ This problem is well documented throughout the literature; however, see Robinson 
(1950) for a detailed overview.
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Tolbert and Smith (2005) also find increased turnout levels in states with frequent 
initiative use. In this study, the authors use voting eligible population (VEP) rather than 
the voting age population (VAP), which removes noncitizens and others ineligible to 
vote. They find that each initiative appearing on the ballot increases VEP turnout by .3%. 
The effects are stronger in midterm elections: each additional initiative on the ballot 
raises voter turnout by 1.7% - enough, they argue, to swing a close election. They 
conclude that substantive measures on the ballot mobilize voters and can “reshape” the 
electorate. The authors also note that differences in the operationalization of “salience” 
may account for the divergent findings regarding presidential elections in this study 
compared to the prior one, wherein no effect was found on presidential elections. They 
note that in the former study salience was measured by post-election media coverage, 
while in the current study an index of variables was constructed to measure pre-election 
coverage.
In a work that eonsiders the notion of ballot fatigue (sometimes referred to as roll-o ff 
or drop-off; in either case, the term refers to the conception that voters may, for one 
reason or another, vote less often as the number of ballot measures increase on a given 
ballot, or that less voting oecurs as the voter moves downward on the ballot, with the top- 
level measures receiving more votes overall than the last measures listed), Bowler, 
Donovan and Happ (1992) find that drop-off is most likely to oecur on the middle of the 
ballot, rather than on the top or bottom, and furthermore that voters are actually quite 
likely to mark the final ballot question -  although they are likely to mark it “no.” 
Moreover, the findings are proposition-specific, in that constitutional measures see more 
drop-off than initiatives, and that increased campaign spending does have a positive 
effect on reducing drop-off, as do elections in which turnout is increased. The authors
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make a fine argument that their findings are theoretically significant insofar as drop-off 
indicates that the “information costs” outweigh the perceived benefit o f voting, and thus, 
the consequence is that overuse o f the process can be problematic.
Absentee voting levels on direct legislation measures were also analyzed by Dubin 
and Kalsow (1996). These authors contend that the “liberalization” of absentee voting 
laws could reshape the electorate and change the outcome o f elections. Their analysis 
suggests that absentee voters have a higher drop-off rate on ballot measures than do 
traditional voters, and in particular, they vote on fewer bond issues, state tax issues, and 
property tax issues than do precinct voters. Conversely, absentee voters mark 
affirmatively more often on issues dealing with education, welfare, and health care than 
do precinct voters.
Thus, scholars have argued that the presence of initiatives (as well as the 
liberalization of absentee voter laws) can reshape the electorate. Can reshaping the 
electorate lead to campaign advantages for candidates? Examining the 2004 election, 
Hillygus and Shields (2005) find no evidence o f salient ballot initiatives affecting the 
vote choice, much to the contrary o f popular belief. In particular, the authors argue that 
when partisan identification, evaluations of the economy, and the war in Iraq were taken 
into consideration, moral issues that had appeared on numerous ballots (e.g., gay rights; 
abortion) had no impact on vote choice, and this outcome held constant among different 
demographics. Thus, the question remains: just how salient does a salient ballot initiative 
have to be to counter the traditional predictors o f vote choiee, sueh as partisan 
identification and economic considerations? Other authors agree: Burden (2004) finds 
support for his hypothesis regarding inereased support from white men and married 
women -  which he translates to concerns about domestic security, rather than for “moral
44
issues” such as immigration and gay rights (certainly, white men and married women 
wouldn’t care for either of these, right?), but also notes that an increase in turnout (but 
does not rule out the presence o f salient initiatives as a factor) helped Bush in 2004. In a 
further study, Abramowitz (2004) also agrees that ballot initiatives bad nothing to do with 
the Bush victory in 2004, instead citing the “normal advantage of ineumbeney and 
preexisting divisions within the American electorate” rather than a fundamental change in 
the ideology o f the electorate. Using the eligible voting population rather than simply the 
voting-age population, Abramowitz’s OLS regression showed that the “presence of gay 
marriage referenda on the ballot had no impact on turnout,” when factoring in turnout in 
the prior election, whether or not the voter lived in a swing state, and the presence of a 
hotly-contested Senate race.
The ability of the GOP to use the initiative to its advantage is seemingly uncertain. 
What is not proved here (or even considered) is whether or not the presence of the moral- 
based ballot initiative hurt it. Clearly, it did not. Hasen (2000) argued that while 
“conventional wisdom holds that the initiative process weakens the role of parties in 
democratic polities,” both parties are beginning to use salient initiatives to “encourage 
voter turnout and refine party stances on issues,” at least in California. Moreover, other 
authors (Hadwiger 1992) conclude that considerable success for ballot measures is found 
in low-tumout elections, sueh as special elections and local-only elections, and argues 
that initiatives should not be placed on such ballots, because the outcome is not 
representative of the larger population. Hadwiger also finds strong support for increased 
spending resulting in increased turnout for a ballot initiative, but finds the largest 
coefficient (predictor of turnout) is the type of measure voted on. In another study 
regarding county-wide elections, Dubin and Kalsow (1996) find that absentee voters are
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much more likely to vote “yes” on questions related to education, health and welfare, 
than precinet voters, although in general, absentee voters cast fewer votes on initiatives 
than do those voting in person.
Moving away from group-level voting behavior, Branton (2003) considers individual 
level voting behavior on state ballot propositions and argues that there are consistent 
patterns in voting behavior on ballot initiatives. In particular, Branton found that 
individual level partisan identification was a key predictor of vote choiee on statewide 
ballot measures, and further analysis found that ballot measure vote choice was 
ideologically parallel to their respective partisan identifications.
Thus, support for the notion that direct democracy increases turnout appears to be 
limited to midterm elections, rather than being independent of the type of election; 
however, none of the scholars found evidence that the institution of direct democracy 
lowered turnout rates.
The so-called ‘educative effects” of direct democracy extend beyond turnout. As 
noted earlier, Progressive-era supporters speculated that the process would increase 
political knowledge on the part of the voter. Early authors present mixed views on the 
“educative” effects on the initiative. Beard (1912) argues that the Oregonian system of a 
state-sponsored program to send arguments in favor of and in opposition to all measures 
placed on a ballot (prepared and paid for by supporters o f the individual measures) could 
have an “immense educational value in arousing the interest of the people, in securing 
consideration o f each measure on its merits, and in turning the search-light of publicity 
and discussion upon all the important political issues in the state” (Beard 1912, 42) 
though other scholars point out that an intelligent voter does not necessarily lead to 
intelligent voting, nor does it lead to uninfluenced voting: problematic people in the
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legislatures are not going to be altered by instituting direct democracy alone, and more 
simply, having low turnout -  and turnout comprised of voters who have not had the 
benefit of deliberation that state legislators have -  is problematic when voting on policies 
directly (Sanborn 1908).
The education process itself presents a fundamental question: who should be doing 
the educating? Haynes (1907) considers the question of the responsibility of the state in 
educating its voters about ballot measures, and finds tbat tbe Oregonian system of 
distributing ballot measure information to each voter prior to election day is in the best 
interest o f the state: the state cannot depend on voters who are only able to read media- 
provided explanation of issues. Moreover, because the citizens are now legislators, they 
should be provided with the same type of information available to legislators with the 
expectation that informed voters may be better able to deliberate among themselves prior 
to election day -  in much the same way that legislators do.
The question of the educative effects of direct democracy is no less prominent for 
scholars o f today. For example, Mark Smith (2002) finds that those who vote on ballot 
measures gain in “civic abilities,” (e.g., political knowledge) while at the same time, non­
voters in the same state see no sueh increases. The author argues that there are two 
important consequences of this finding. First, insofar as increased political knowledge 
was a goal o f the original advocates of direct democracy, the process has proven 
successful. Secondly, following the tenets of participatory democratic theory (especially 
as outlined by Rousseau and John Stuart Mill), participation precedes political awareness
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and increases in both political knowledge and c a p a c i t y f o r  political knowledge, and 
thus, (at least for this author) the process o f  voting on ballot initiatives may lead to 
increased political awareness. Although the author does control for factors that affect 
political knowledge (e.g., the ability, motivation, and opportunity of an individual to 
acquire such knowledge) the author does not account for the endogeneity that may be 
present: the results may not be as much participation leading to increased political 
knowledge as increased political knowledge lead to participation. In short, this author 
claims causation when only correlation is proven. ' * In a later work, the authors consider 
the social capital data put forth by Putnam (1995) and argue tbat states witb frequent 
ballot initiatives have higher levels of social capital even after controlling for economic, 
social and political variations across the states (Smith and Tolbert 2004, 71); ftirtber, tbey 
argue in a separate work (Tolbert and Smith 2006, 25) that the educative effects o f the 
process on “civic engagement, political participation, interest groups and political parties 
may prove to be equally, or more, important than any policy resulting from its 
instrumental use.”
Zisk (1987) questions the efficacy of direct democracy to increase political 
knowledge on the part of the voter, noting that turnout levels have not increased 
significantly, that a large number of polls report “undecided” on controversial issues, and 
also tbat drop-off figures for initiatives and referenda compared to candidates on
The term “capacity” as used by Smitb (2002) is apparently meant to mean “ability” in 
the sense that “capacity” could be considered to be that w hich  hum ans are born with. 
Thus, participation would not be able to increase “capacity” as considered here, though it 
could increase an individual’s ability to increase political knowledge.
' '  The author is clear that causation has been proven: “Tbis finding indicates that it is 
voting on initiatives, rather than merely living in a state that allows them, that creates the 
increases in political knowledge” (Smith 2002, 900).
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statewide ballots signify little evidence of increased knowledge or motivation on the part 
of the voter that can be attributed to direct democracy. Moreover, she notes that well- 
financed media campaigns are quite successful in defeating initiatives sponsored by ad- 
hoc groups, and that in particular, the extraordinarily superficial advertisements (e.g., 
“Prop D is Dumb”) that have proven effective do not capture the goal of increased 
educative capacity that the Progressives had hoped for (Zisk 1987, 251).
While the authors presented here make the case for an educative benefit o f direct 
democracy, the conclusions should be questioned. It would be an error in logic to assume 
(or argue, as some authors have done here) that the mere presence of an initiative would 
better educate an individual citizen, make an individual citizen more likely to participate, 
or increase tbe internal or external efficacy of tbat citizen. Quite simply, an individual 
citizen must still put forth the effort to educate himself, and while salient issues may be 
much more likely to motivate participation, such participation does not automatically 
equate to guaranteed long-term participation. Increased turnout in a single election due to 
a highly salient initiative does not constitute increased participation, knowledge or 
efficacy. However, what the process may do is provide an increase in the possibility that 
voters could become more politically active. To argue any more than that would be to 
overreach.
Interest Group Influence in Direct Democracy
Along with the unresponsive nature of state legislatures, interest groups may have 
provided the greatest motivation in the Progressives’ push for governmental reform in the 
form of direct democracy. Indeed, the notion of the citizenry at the forefront of American 
politics was, as has been shown here, at the heart of the Populist and Progressive 
arguments. However, the early arguments that direct democracy was immediately
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successful in disarming special interests (U’Ren 1907; Ford 1912; Guthrie 1912; Smith, 
M 2002) may have been premature.
Magelby (1984) argues that among the first groups to take advantage of the initiative 
may have been large special interests themselves. He provides the example of a 
“competing railroad” unable to break into a geographic territory because of the 
monopolistic corporate nature o f the time that could claim machine politics and seek the 
vote o f the people. Magelby further argues that the Progressives themselves may not have 
been as “diverse” as they have been made out to be; conversely, many were middle class, 
urban, and well-educated, self-employed businessmen. Thus, the motivation may not 
have necessarily been a better government, but rather, a chance to change the rules that 
prevented the status quo from being changed.
Conceptualized in this way, yet another paradox in direct democracy emerges: the 
notion that the process has been co-opted by the very organizations (e.g., insurance 
conglomerates, trial lawyer associations, large tobacco companies) that it was meant to 
defend against cannot be true, mainly because the process was never the vox populi that it 
was made out to be, and thus, could not be co-opted in the first place. The assumption 
that many scholars have made (Gerber 1998; Smith and Lubinski 2002) is direct 
democracy was once an institution that was, in some way or another, “off limits” to large 
organizations, and available only to those groups who intended to improve democracy in 
America.. The early days of the institution were easily imagined: economic interests 
were not allowed to participate; powerful groups feared the inevitability o f defeat via the 
initiative; and the people had succeeded in taking back their government. Moreover, these 
scholars further asserted that “somewhere” along the way, the once-defeated, well-heeled 
special interests groups were able to take over the mechanism used so often against them,
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and transform it into a tool through which programs received the stamp o f approval from 
the masses and became public law.
Smith and Lubinski (2002) consider this point and provide ease-study evidence that 
directly refutes the notion the initiative and referendum were originally used to “cheek 
the corporate dominance of state legislatures” (Smith and Lubinski 2002, 351). They 
find that while eitizen-based initiatives intended to combat special interests were among 
the thirty-two propositions on the 1912 general election ballot, special interests 
themselves (mainly mining interests and public utilities) were also heavily involved in the 
process. Interestingly, these special interests did not utilize overt tactics to seek support; 
instead, they attempted to cloak their sponsorship -  indeed, they sought to misdirect 
sponsorship o f initiatives towards less threatening groups, and also utilized counter­
initiatives. Thus, the authors argue that “the case demonstrates how special interests 
during the Progressive Era were able to subvert the initiative process by intentionally 
placing a measure on the ballot to confuse voters...or have citizens unwittingly pass 
legislation...” (Smith and Lubinski 2002, 364).
Oregon was not alone in experiencing this phenomenon. In a work that focuses on 
California two decades later, Goebel (2002) makes several notable points regarding the 
formation of direct democracy as an institution. First, he argues that economics, and not 
politics, was the main driving force behind the reform community’s push for the 
initiative, referendum, and recall -  and that in particular, they were conceptualized as a 
method to abolish “oppressive monopolies and artificial trusts in America by removing 
the legislative basis for their existence” (Goebel 2002, 11). This notion of antimonopoly 
sentiment has deep roots in American culture, and it was the Populist movement o f the 
1890s that widely highlighted these sentiments. Goebel argues that “populist
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republicanism” (a framework that reeoneeptualized the Marxist and liberalism notions of 
economics determining politics into one based on longstanding American antimonopoly 
sentiments that saw politics as determining economies) was based on “intellectual and 
political tradition that stretched back to the early decades o f the nineteenth century” 
(Goebel 2002, 12).
Secondly, Goebel argues that Progressive ambition notwithstanding, direct 
democracy in the early part of tbe twentieth century quickly became a tool of special 
interests -  and not one o f Progressive reformers. This was mainly due to the rising 
campaign costs (e.g., the costs o f gathering signatures for petitions and media relations) 
and the rapid rise of an industry o f professional signature gatherers. In some states, such 
as California, there were no geographic restrictions on the gathering o f signatures (i.e., 
signatures required in a certain percentage of counties in a state) and thus, signatures 
could be gleaned from dense urban areas. The process favored those who were already 
powerful; groups that had been targeted only a short time before had essentially been 
given yet another weapon: “ .. .it was highly ironic that [these] same groups were the ones 
that acquired even further politieal leverage with the help of the initiative and 
referendum” (Goebel 2002, 154).
Third, Goebel argues that the process of direct democracy was able to become a 
stronger institution in the American West because “weak parties coexisted with powerful 
interest groups” which allowed a political culture to develop that included direct 
democracy (Goebel 2002, 136). Conversely, tbe parties were better able to control the 
political landscape in other areas o f the country, and were better able to deter the 
proliferation o f the movement by using legal maneuverings, never adopting the process in
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the first place, or simply reacquiring the dominance that was temporarily lost in the 
Progressive and Populist heydays.
Recent scholars consider interest groups and direct democracy with a slightly 
different focus. Boehmke (2005) considers the indirect effects of direct legislation by 
examining how institutions shape interest group systems. In particular, his research 
question asks how the ability o f organized interest groups to circumvent the legislative 
process alters traditional state and interest group politics, and argues that access to the 
direct legislation process produces important differences in the interest group populations 
in initiative and noninitiative states, in terms of both quantity and strategy. Boehmke 
argues that states that have the initiative process have 30% more interest groups and 40% 
more citizen groups, which in turn makes them more representative. Furthermore, interest 
group strategy is affected by the type of group and its available resources: Boebmke 
argues that groups in initiative states have more members and fewer financial resources, 
which forces them to emphasize “outsider” strategies, such as organizing protests, rather 
than “insider strategies,” which may include directly contacting legislators or testifying 
before committees. Finally, Boehmke finds that initiative states will adopt policies 
quicker than non-initiative states, and that policy adoptions by initiative states will be 
informative to non-initiative states considering similar policies. Thus, the indirect effects 
of direct legislation affect policy adoption, policy diffusion, interest group mobilization, 
interest group characteristics, and interest group lobbying behavior.
Insofar as direct democracy was initially installed as a method to increase 
responsiveness and responsibility among state governments, primarily by neutralizing 
powerful special interest influence over the legislatures, the question of the success of 
this method is largely unresolved. Gerber (1999) frames the question as the “Populist
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Paradox” -  the notion that “direet legislation has paradoxically become a powerful 
instrument of wealthy interest groups rather than a popular balance between [eitizen and 
eeonomie] groups” (5).
Gerber begins her systematie study by offering a typology of direet legislation 
options available to interest groups; the direct modification of the status quo (at the ballot 
box); the indireet modifieation of the status quo (pressuring other aetors, sueh as state 
legislators); direet preservation of the status quo; and indireet preservation o f the status 
quo. A further typology separates “eeonomie” interest groups (groups with large finaneial 
resources, sueh as a trial lawyers, ete) from “personnel” interest groups (groups with few 
financial resources but widespread membership). Gerber further categorizes several 
“hurdles” that must be overcome to plaee a proposition on the ballot: drafting the 
measure, qualifying the measure, running a suceessful campaign, ete., but also notes that 
opposing strategies are available as well: proposing counter (killer) initiatives, forming a 
campaign against an initiative, ete. Thus, to the extent that interest groups must overcome 
any one (or any number) of these hurdles, the ability to overcome these hurdles depends 
strongly on the type of resources the group has (whether economic or personnel) and the 
option pursued by the group (e.g., direct or indirect modification or preservation of the 
status quo). In other words, groups have “comparative advantages” depending on 
membership composition (Gerber 1999: 76) and thus, the strategies they choose are 
largely dependent upon the resources produced by the membership composition.
Gerber makes three main conclusions from several tested hypotheses. First, she 
concludes that economic interests use direct legislation to pass laws, but they are more 
often used to preserve the status quo, or to pressure the legislature (thus, direct 
preservation of the status quo; indirect modification/preservation of the status quo), while
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citizen groups will often use direct legislation to pass new laws (direct modification of 
the status quo). Consequently, the notion that economic groups dominate the direct 
legislation process is not supported.
Seeondly, Gerber argues that there is a statistically significant difference in state 
policies between states with and without direet legislation. In particular, policies in 
initiative states “more closely reflect estimated state median voters’ preferences” (Gerber 
1999: 135). Further, this effeet is greatest where access to direct legislation is easiest in 
terms of qualifications. Gerber concludes that this is a function of direet democracy, in 
that the threat o f an initiative (put forth by either type o f group) is enough to make the 
legislature pass laws closer to the median voter’s preferences when sueh a measure is 
available.
Finally, Gerber argues that sinee interest group behavior translates to policy 
outcomes, laws that pass via the initiative as a result of citizen-based groups should better 
reflect opinions of broad groups, while laws that fail via the initiative process should 
reflect the interests o f economic groups. Gerber finds support for both arguments, and 
concludes that “although the populist paradox takes a form different from the one alleged 
by modem critics o f direct democracy, it is nevertheless, a paradox” (Gerber 1999: 144). 
The paradox, of course, is not that powerful economic groups can pass whatever laws 
they wish, but that they have significant success in influencing policy by maintaining the 
status quo and indirectly influencing state legislators.
Other authors are not so quick to agree. Alexander (2002) utilizes a dual case study 
approach to contradict Gerber’s’ quantitative study of interest groups activities and 
campaign finance data from 161 different initiative and referendum campaigns in eight 
states. Alexander considers two gaming initiatives, California’s tribal gaming proposition
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and the Missouri riverboat gaming proposition in an attempt to answer three main 
questions regarding interest group participation in the process of direct democracy. First, 
he considers the question of “which groups” are involved in the process, and finds that in 
these cases, gambling-based interest groups supported the measures in the states, while 
Nevada-based gaming groups opposed; furthermore, in the Missouri case, religious 
groups formed in opposition to the measure and formed (strangely) alliances with Nevada 
gaming groups. Thus, gaming interests were largely in favor, while citizens groups were 
largely in opposition.
Secondly, he ponders the nature of the activities that the groups are engaged in, and 
finds that both groups adopted an “us versus them” approach, and the traditional roles 
held (insofar as economic groups raised money while citizen groups raised personnel 
resources). Finally, Alexander contradicts Gerber’s earlier finding by arguing that the 
economic groups were able to raise both money and personnel resources, and implies that 
while the primary indicator of success or failure includes the levels of resources (whether 
monetary or personnel), citizen groups actually do not have an advantage when trying to 
directly modify the status quo, and economic groups do have an advantage when 
attempting to directly maintain the status quo.
Gerber’s examination of the “populist paradox” is a well-rounded, methodical study 
of an important question. Gerber illustrates her thesis simply, and selects relevant 
independent variables to specify her model. In particular, her categorization of the 
different types of interest groups, as well as the different types of influence they may 
attempt to achieve, allows the conclusions to build flawlessly on the premises. Her 
conclusion supports earlier studies by Donovan, et al (1998) that found economic groups 
more successful at preserving the status quo as opposed to changing it, and adds the
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element of indirect influence on the state legislators or other policymakers. Insofar as her 
work rests upon the assumption that the median voter’s preferences are actually 
responsible preferences, the research could be expanded to consider the long-term effects 
o f policy outcomes via direct democracy. Matching interest groups’ preferences to state 
policy and to the median voter does not necessarily indicate responsible policy, althougb 
it does indicate responsive policy.
Alexander’s refutation o f Gerber appears problematic. Alexander begins his book 
by noting that two case studies will hardly produce generalizable results. Instead, his goal 
is to uncover the complexities of the process in an effort to better understand the 
dynamics at work in the interest group-direct democracy relationships. However, he 
concludes his book by clearly refuting Gerber’s conclusion that economic groups were 
able to raise both personnel and money (going so far as to quote her by name, actually). 
Given the difficulty in generalizations, it seems that a refutation of an earlier 
(quantitative, longitudinal) study is not within the acceptable range of options, especially 
from a case study (cross-sectional) approach. Putting aside for a moment the fact that 
both of Alexander’s case studies involved the same subject (gaming), there is no 
indication that the groups outlined in Alexander’s work were actually eeonomie groups, 
insofar as described by Gerber. In other words, while “eeonomie” based interest groups 
in Alexander’s work were able to mobilize persormel resources in addition to monetary 
resources, Alexander could have done a better job examining (and showing) the 
similarities between “his” economic groups and the economic groups outlined in 
Gerber’s work. It is not likely that the “eeonomie” groups outlined in Alexander are the 
same trial lawyers or insurance groups that populated Gerber’s works. The eeonomie 
groups outlined in Alexander’s seem to be broad based citizens groups that had a little
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more money than the next group. Moreover, Alexander noted that coalitions composed of 
“strange bedfellows” were in support of this measure. How were these coalitions 
classified? While it is clearly possible that Gerber’s thesis could be refuted (and is likely 
wrong, in my opinion -  eeonomie interests eould likely mobilize personnel if they needed 
to -  they just didn’t need to) it is not possible to refute it from the evidence presented 
here.
Thus, the Progressive notion that direct democracy would essentially break the back 
o f special interests groups does not appear to have been fulfilled. There are likely several 
explanations for tbis. First, because interest groups are designed to fulfill tbeir own 
purposes, and bave developed specialized procedures for accomplishing such tasks (e.g., 
offering selective incentives to overcome collective action problems), the very presence 
of tbe initiative and referenda does not deter tbe group from maintaining access to its 
preferred group: the state legislature. Indeed, because direet democracy is not restrictive 
in any way (and any prohibitive restrictions, such as signature requirements, would be 
best overcome by groups) tbere was no reason wby an interest group would not 
immediately seek access to this new vehicle of policy aggregation. Clearly, not all 
Populist and Progressive measures were popular (especially the Populist attempts to 
increase inflation) and special interests would have quickly realized that they could take 
advantage of a process geared towards groups with resources (better able to overcome tbe 
requirements), a media that had little formal rules, and what was likely an unsophisticated 
electorate. Indeed, tbe Farmer’s Alliance, wbich was instrumental in tbe formulation of 
Populism, and later direct democracy (Barens 2004), was itself an interest group. That 
campaigns, whether for candidates or initiative, are often intentionally elusive (especially 
as far as sponsors go) is seemingly axiomatic and timeless.
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The influence o f special interests on the institution o f direct democracy does seem to 
be well-determined. Scholars agree that narrow-material interests (such as trial lawyers or 
tobacco companies) are much more likely to be successful in defeating initiatives and 
maintaining the status quo than in passing initiatives. Conversely, broad based groups 
that may make up in resources (e.g., personnel) what they lack in funds have found 
success in getting a wide variety o f measures passed via the initiative. Thus, the 
Progressive dream may have been realized, but only insofar as broad-based groups 
appear to be more successful at getting initiatives passed than groups that are traditionally 
considered “well-heeled special interests.”
Direct Democracy, Public Opinion, and Policy Outcomes 
Proceeding with the assumption that interest group desires may not always correlate 
with citizen preferences, a cursory look at direct democracy and public opinion, as well 
as policy outcomes, may be helpful. This section does not consider the original 
arguments o f the Progressives, but deals with salient issues in the institution o f direct 
democracy today.
Bowler and Donovan (1994) consider information and opinion change models, and 
find that the lack o f “cues” available to voters on ballot initiatives results in traditional 
opinion change models not holding when applied to direct democracy. In particular, they 
argue that the initial stages of the campaign are characterized by low levels of voter 
awareness, and this leaves little room for a later conversion. However, as the campaign 
continues and voters become more aware of a given proposition, stability appears to be 
the norm, and no serious link is found between campaign exposure and individual level 
opinions. They also find that “awareness” is required for opinion formation, and that the
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higher educated will utilize more sources o f information (such as public voter guides), 
which will result in higher levels of awareness.
Nicholson (2003), on a slightly different track, considers the factors that contribute 
to ballot proposition awareness. Nicbolson finds that “environmental” factors, such as the 
electoral cycle, media coverage, campaign spending, issue characteristics, and the 
number of days before an election, all contribute to ballot proposition awareness. Using 
California polling numbers as the dependent variable, Nicholson finds that between 1956- 
2000, midterm elections, initiatives that dealt with moral or civil rights questions, media 
eoverage, and campaign spending all increased ballot initiative awareness, wbile 
increased numbers of initiatives on a particular ballot, and the number of days to an 
election had a decreased effect on ballot initiative awareness. Most importantly perhaps, 
is Nicholson’s finding that increased negative spending increased ballot initiative 
awareness considerably, while positive spending (in favor of) resulted in a small, non- 
statistically significant coefficient.
In finding that direct democracy states are not a predictor of increased policy 
responsiveness, Laseher, Hagen and Rochlin (1996) specified a very creative model. The 
authors seemed to do well to utilize aggregated surveys of public opinion as the 
dependent variable to measure tbe desires of citizens. Moreover, these authors also 
eonsidered the frequency of initiative use and the type of initiative most often used in an 
effort to gauge the overall ability of the initiative process to correspond with public 
opinion. They also chose to operationalize their variables along a liberal-conservative 
continuum, selecting policies such as education spending, health and welfare spending, 
enaetment of various consumer protection laws, legalized gambling measures, and tax 
progressivity. The idea was to develop an index of “electorate ideology” and then
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compare that index to an index of “policy ideology.” Scatterplot analysis should show a 
stronger relationship between these two in initiative states versus noninitiative states, and 
it did not. A second model used policy outcome as tbe dependent variable and included 
socioeconomic variables as controls to test whether the presence of the initiatives would 
enhance the extent to which a relatively “conservative state electorate obtained 
conservative policies” and vice-versa. Again, the results were negative. Contradicting 
earlier arguments that direct democracy acts as an” increased veto power” used by the 
citizens to ensure responsiveness (the notion being that a purely representative 
democracy leads to principal-agent problems, and legislator shirking), these authors find 
four essential explanations as to wby direct democracy fails to enhance responsiveness.
First, although the threat of an initiative may force legislators to consider the topic 
(Gerber 1996; 1998), legislators may also serve as an “appeals court that ameliorates the 
effects of ballot measures for large groups.” Secondly, the authors argue that initiatives 
themselves are “imperfect reflections of the public’s desires” insofar as voters are “not 
necessarily representative of the electorate as a whole” (e.g., higher socioeconomic 
status). Thus, initiatives that may favor lower socioeconomic groups are less likely to 
pass given the electorate composition. Third, “organized interest groups dominate the use 
of the interest group process,” mainly due to the organizational hurdles required to 
successfully place a measure on the ballot. Finally, the authors argue that the underlying 
premise (that legislators are unresponsive in the first place) may be flawed, and that 
“state legislatures and other policymakers take public opinion into account when enacting 
state policy” (773).
Turning attention to policy outcomes resulting from direct democracy finds no less 
of a debate. Gamble (1997) argues tbat “without tbe filtering mechanisms of the
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representative system, direct democracy promotes majority tyranny.” In so doing, 
Gamble evaluates three decades o f initiatives and legislative referenda from five civil 
rights policy areas (housing, school desegregation, gay rights and AIDS policies) and 
finds that initiatives that restrict civil rights are prone to extraordinary electoral success; 
75% passage, while during the same period, only 33% of other initiatives passed.
Matsusaka (1995) considers fiscal policies and direct democracy, and finds that 
spending is, on average, 4% lower in states with direct democracy; that local spending is 
higher and state spending is lower; and that on the revenue side, states with direct 
democracy rely less on broad based taxes and more on charges tied to services. He 
concludes that, taken together, this means that “the initiative leads to a reduction in the 
overall size of the government sector and suggests that it causes a decline in the level of 
redistributional activity.” Focusing on the economic theory of government (change 
occurs via conflict but within the constraints o f institutional rules), Matsusaka argues that 
the lack o f “log-rolling” mechanisms (or gains-from-trade hypotheses) may result in 
outcomes that are closer to the median voter preferences, and that, in particular, fiscal 
outcomes in direct democracy states should be closer to median voter preferences than 
those in noninitiative states.
Extending works reviewed here (Matsusaka 1995; Laseher, Hagen and Rochlin 
1996), Camobreco (1998) also takes on the responsiveness question, and in particular, 
with regard to fiscal policies. Using state and local tax revenues per capita, state and local 
tax “efforts” (the extent to which states use their available tax base) and state and local 
expenditures per capita as dependent variables, Camobreco finds no evidence that 
“presence o f the initiative process strengthens the link between preferences and fiscal
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policies.” The author also finds evidence that Matsusaka’s (1995) notion that initiative 
states shift their sources of revenue and spending may be correct.
Fiscal policies may create unintended consequences, and tbis may be the case if  they 
are installed via the initiative, or by state legislators. Bowler and Donovan (2004) find 
tbat state tax and spending limitations (TEL’s) bave spurred tbe creation of local 
governmental districts in response to constraints placed on budgeting. Tbese “special 
districts” are created by state legislatures and generally mandated to fulfill a specific 
service (e.g., library districts, bealtb districts, parks and recreation districts) and have the 
“power to tax, to charge fees, issue debt, appropriate land for public use.” Thus, states 
may create special districts in order to continue to provide goods and services despite 
constraints mandated by TEL’s.
If tax and spending limitations do in fact limit spending, it seems intuitive to tbink 
that schools may suffer as well. Gerber, et al (2001) consider tbis question during a study 
of tbe effects o f California’s Proposition 13 and Proposition 4 in 1978. Proposition 13 
was intended to drastically reduce property taxes (and cap future levels) wbile 
Proposition 4 would limit spending to either the rate o f inflation or the percentage 
increase in personal income. As Gerber notes, many bave blamed tbe deteriorating 
condition in tbe California schools on the passing of Proposition 13. However, Gerber 
argues tbat tbis blame is quite meritless.
Gerber wisely considers the context of per pupil spending in broad fashion. She finds 
that an earlier California Supreme Court decision {Serrano v. Priest) outlawed the 
practice of funding schools at the district levels, and instead mandated that all districts 
would be required to receive tbe same levels o f state-granted funding. The idea was to 
equalize the districts, since the old way resulted in wealthier districts providing higher
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levels of funding for their schools. Gerber also notes that the older method resulted in 
motivations and willingness to pay higher property taxes at the local level; as the 
equalization method was implemented, the motivation evaporated.'^
In effect, the Court decision did equalize districts; however, the consequences were 
once again unintended: net funding in the districts decreased. Over time, however, Gerber 
finds that the Court’s decision, as well as Propositions 4 and 13, had little effect on the 
rate of per pupil spending in California. The impact was apparent, but it was indirect. 
Gerber finds that the observed declines are “the consequence of a state that had grown 
significantly less affluent relative to other states in the country and that persists in 
allocating a smaller share of its budgetary resources to public schools.” By observing 
this to be the case before and after the propositions were passed, Gerber shows that the 
gap in California funding relative to other states is not the direct consequence of lower 
property taxes, and by extension, not the consequence of direct democracy.
In sum, Bowler and Donovan’s (1994) work on information and opinion change may 
have been improved slightly by the use of categories for ballot initiatives. In other words, 
voter awareness is likely to be significantly different for an “English only” law from what 
it would be for a sales tax exemption for farm vehicles. However, the overall additions to 
the literature are well-received, as are Nicholson’s contribution regarding environmental 
factors. In particular, Nicholson’s (2003) finding that negative spending increases ballot 
proposition awareness supported earlier studies by Donovan, et al (1998) and Gerber 
(1999). Gamble’s (1997) argument that direct democracy promotes majority tyranny
It should be noted that the premise o f Gerber’s work is to show that differences exist in 
how initiatives are implemented. In the current case, the initiative was implemented 
quickly and efficiently; in other cases, governmental actors simply ignored the initiative, 
wrote unfriendly legislation, or in other ways attempted to alter the effect.
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seems to focus too much on smaller municipalities. Donovan and Bowler (1998) 
(following Madison’s logic in Federalist 10) find that the tyranny that more easily occurs 
on a municipal level does not occur when similar measures are voted upon at a state 
level. Moreover, they argue that the courts routinely act as a protector in cases such as 
these.
Although Laseher, et al (1996) argue that their data contradict Matsusaka (1995) in 
terms of the ability o f the initiative to produce state level policies more in line with the 
median voter’s preferences, it is likely that the divergence is a matter of the policies 
studied. For Matsusaka, the policies under examination were tax and spend policies, and 
most voters, whether it is in their long term interest or not, would like less taxes, and 
(oddly enough) less spending, though most voters are aware of the link between the two. 
Insofar as Matsusaka finds lower spending in states with direct legislation (likely a 
function of initiative -based tax and spend limitations, although not mentioned in this 
article) this is much more likely to align with median voter preferences. Laseher, et al., 
examine a wide range of policy areas, and find that the electorate ideology rarely 
coincides with the ideology of the policy outcomes. This could be a function of many 
things, including the type of initiative under examination, the difficulty in getting an 
initiative on the ballot in a given state, the political culture of the nation at the time of the 
election, or the economic conditions in the state at the time of voting. Moreover, “state 
ideology” is problematic as well. Defining state ideology in Nevada is tough, and the 
north-south split is likely less pronounced in Nevada than it is in California. Thus, 
determining policy responsiveness in states with and without the initiative may be too 
difficult a process to measure, and especially so when considered across time.
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Minority Rights and Direct Democracy
The issue of minority rights may be a more recent issue in direct democracy, likely 
due to the increasing heterogeneity of the population of the course o f the century. Though 
the process was seen as an impetus in the women’s suffrage movement (Ford 1912; 
Guthrie 1912), the Progressives viewed themselves as the minority and proceeded as 
such. Thus, subsequent initiatives and referenda dealing with minorities in America are a 
wholly new issue, and some of the more salient components o f the issue are considered 
here.
Although not specifically referring to minorities, Matsusaka (1992) argues that state 
legislators act as a sort of “filter” for issues, taking the easy ones (termed Pareto -  
comparable, because the outcomes are such that the “majority-favorable” outcome is easy 
to detemiine) and leaving the “distributional” issues (divisive issues that take power or 
resources from one group and give to another, such as English-only initiatives) for the 
voters to decide via the initiative. Thus, for Matsusaka, a well-functioning system is one 
that has multiple distributional issues on the ballot via the initiative process, and this 
outcome is favorable because voters are likely to have more information on the 
controversial, divisive issues than they would on non-controversial, efficient issues.
If Matsusaka attempts to explain why hot-button social issues are more likely to be 
decided via the direct democracy process, Tolbert and Hero (2001) further the debate 
with an explanation of how minorities fare in the process. They analyze support for 
initiatives that target minorities and find that support for such initiatives was largely a 
function of the context of the residential area in which the voters lived. Specifically, 
support for such initiatives was higher in counties with bifurcated minorities and in 
counties with very low racial diversity (homogeneous). White support for measures that
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restrict minority rights is lowest in heterogeneous racial and ethnic counties. The same 
authors argued in an earlier study that there has been in a sense a “new populism” in 
California: using the initiatives against minorities by mainly white elites because the 
legislature had, in their minds, become overly representative of tbe minorities. In a sense, 
tbe increased Latino and black influence in tbe state resulted in a voter backlash against 
the gains of all minorities in the state legislature.
In an earlier study, Wenzel, Donovan and Bowler (1998) argue that the tolerance 
required to vote against an initiative requires “a commitment of substantial cognitive 
resources.” In traditional elections, “elites” lead tbe way in fostering tolerance, as well as 
“tolerant” position'^ through the natural (and generally requisite) deliberative process. 
The problem, as tbese authors see it, is that in an initiative campaign, no such elites exist, 
and thus, the possibility for exploitation becomes more real, since no deliberation among 
the elites takes place. If the assumptions that campaigns can change attitudes are 
accurate, then the debate that arises over soeial issues may be sueeessful in setting the 
agenda (Nicholson 2003). Tbe present authors find mixed results, but conclude that direct 
democracy “may operate to the detriment of the toleration o f political out-groups.”
Donovan and Bowler (1998) also consider whether direct democracy produces 
policies that are more hostile to minorities than do state legislatures. In response to 
Gamble (1997), who argues that direct legislation facilitates tyranny over minorities, the 
authors argue that while this may occur on a local level, it is unlikely to happen on a state 
level, for much the same reason that Madison predicted in Federalist 10 -  enlargement.
The word “tolerance” as used here is apparently meant to imply some degree of 
equality, or a lack of tyrannical measures. The choice of words, however, could lead 
some to argue that “tolerance” presupposes that one side has a superior position, and 
simply “allows” the other to exist -  subject to recall at whim.
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When the eleetorate has been inereased beyond the munieipal level, polieies are less 
likely to be abusive o f minority rights.
The study of direet demoeraey and its impaet on minorities is an extraordinarily 
interesting and worthwhile pursuit. As the number of minorities inerease in Ameriea -  
and in many areas, eonstituting a majority-minority -  the tension between minorities and 
nonminorities has inereased as well. The eoneurrent rise in the use of direet demoeraey 
should motivate the study in order to ensure that the proeess preserves and protects the 
rights of all Americans. In particular, further research could focus on the role o f the 
courts as a eounter-majoritarian force in American society, and whether they are holding 
to that notion when direct democracy is concerned, and further, if  the conditions for anti­
minority voting behavior discovered by Tolbert and Hero hold in other locales as well. 
Again, attention must be paid to the relative difficulty in qualifying a measure for the 
ballot, as well as the relative popularity o f a measure in relation to the vote share. This is 
because in majority-minority districts, a majority o f voters may still be non-minority. In 
other words, if  minorities make up the large majority of the district, but yet constitute an 
excessive minority of the actual voting population, rights of minorities are more likely to 
be abused.
State Legislatures
Scholars writing in the early part o f the twentieth century were well aware of the 
problems of the state legislatures. In particular, Sanborn (1908) argued that state 
legislators of the period often enacted laws that were “unwise, uncalled for, ill- 
considered, or positively bad” and that they often took the form of favoring special 
interest groups (though this occurred more often in municipal councils than in state
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legislatures), that the laws may unnecessarily interfere in human conduct and thus not 
conducive to laissez faire  governmental practice, or conversely, that the legislature may 
not be passing laws which would be in the public’s best interest. The notion that state 
legislatures were problematic because of special interest influence was also realized in 
states that did not necessarily consider themselves “progressive.” Thomas (1914) writes 
that Arkansas in the early twentieth century was noted for its expensive and ineffective 
legislature; however, attempts to bring direct democracy to the state failed on the first 
attempt. Though later attempt were successful, the state process found considerable 
opposition in the form of the state supreme court (Thomas 1914). Later scholars argued 
along the same lines: Bolton (1971) argues that while legislators have “great power to 
make policy,” the power is generally used to formalize polieies that have been developed 
outside the legislatures, and most often with special interest groups or state bureaucracies 
(Bolton 1971, 57).
State legislatures are a dynamic institution. Indeed, legislatures have been the focus 
of many scholars over the years. Recently, Rosenthal (1996) identified three perspectives 
from which state legislatures are viewed: legislative reform (from the 1960s to the 
1970s), legislative professionalism (1980s), and legislative institutionalization (1990s). 
Rosenthal argues that the first perspective, legislative reform, was motivated in large part 
by an evaluation report authored by the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, which 
made both general recommendations as well as individual state level recommendations. 
In particular, Rosenthal notes that the most important consequence o f this era was that of 
institutional capacity -  which helped both legislatures and legislators. Institutional 
capacity in this sense refers to the notion of inereased physical space, inereased time, and 
increased information. Additionally, equalizing the domination that had occurred
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between the legislative and executive branches was also a goal; this came to fruition in 
many states via the budget process -  no longer would the legislatures “rubber stamp” the 
governor’s budget.
The second perspective, legislative professionalism, was largely geared towards 
making state legislatures better emulate the U.S. Congress. However, conceptual 
differences abound among scholars as to what should constitute “professionalism.” 
Though the concept will be discussed below, Rosenthal argues that a consequence o f 
legislative professionalism is that it generally attracts professional legislators, which in 
turn further professionalizes the legislature, which again in turn attracts more professional 
legislators.
The third perspective is that of legislative institutionalization. This perspective 
considers Polsby’s (1968) definition of legislative institutionalization at the national level 
and applies it to the state level. Briefly, legislatures are institutionalized when (1) 
organization is well-bounded and differentiated from its environment; (2) the 
organization is relatively complex, with separated functions (i.e., committee structures); 
and (3) the organization relies on universaliStic criteria and automatic rather than 
discretionary methods for conducting and managing internal business. Though state 
legislatures can be defined as having well-defined boundaries, the notions of complexity 
and universalistic criteria find little support when applied to state legislatures. However, 
Rosenthal (1996) argues that the “relaxation” of quantified measures may be in order, as 
suggested by Polsby. Thus, by focusing on “boundedness” (i.e., the separation of the 
institution from its environment) Rosenthal argues that not only did almost all state 
legislatures become institutionalized at one point, a new, (and fourth) perspective can be 
realized -  that of institutional decay -  or, deinstitutionalization.
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Legislative deinstitutionalization can be seen in three main factors; personnel 
differentiation, adherence to norms, and managerial autonomy. In particular, Rosenthal 
(1996) argues that personnel differentiation is seen in increased levels of turnover within 
state legislatures (attributed in part to redistricting efforts, gains on the part of Republican 
officeholders, especially in the south, and the initial effects of term limits), that adherence 
(or in this case, non-adherence) to norms can be seen in decreased levels o f institutional 
loyalty (conceptualized of in terms of members running “against” the legislature in 
campaigns) and finally, managerial authority has been limited by tenn limits, and - 
important for this thesis -  initiatives and referenda that circumvent legislative autonomy, 
such as tax and expenditure limitations.
The notion of institutionalization was also studied by Berry, Berkman and 
Schneiderman (2000) who argued that legislative professionalism promotes legislative 
institutionalization by establishing boundaries that shield members from external shocks. 
Thus, not only do members from a more professional legislature have a higher likelihood 
o f winning reelection, but such professionalization also “buffers” the member from 
external political forces, the effects of national economic conditions, and the coattail 
effect. In such a situation, a Democratic state legislator is less likely to face a 
disadvantage even if a Republican president wins a landslide re-election on the coattails 
of a very strong economy. Insofar as the effect of both national conditions and coattails 
(this time in the sense of higher office elections) has weakened over time when 
considering national legislative elections, the correlation between increased resources and 
such weakening in both national and sub-national legislatures indicated that the declining 
influence o f national forces has been caused by increases in congressional resources 
(Berry, Berkman and Schneiderman 2000: 871). However, the benefits of
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institutionalization on members o f the legislatures do not proteet against the 
deinstitutionalization proeess deseribed earlier by Rosenthal (1996) and in partieular, 
against the imposition o f authority by the people via direet demoeraey.
Weber (1999) argues that the institutional arrangement of state legislatures is 
problematic. In particular, he notes that state legislators may have too much self-interest 
in the things that they control, such as legislating on issues in which they can not be 
disinterested (e.g., district-drawing; staffing; resources) and that the ultimate consequence 
of this is that it undermines the public confidence in the institution, and further 
eontributes to the media focus o f corruption. Weber argues that reform measures, such as 
independent district-drawing commissions, legislative expense commissions (that deal 
with staffing and expenses, including legislator pay levels), campaign finance 
commissions, and independent state ethics commissions will help to return public 
confidence to the institution.
Exactly what constitutes professionalism within state legislatures is open to some 
debate, though attempts to operationalize the variable all contain at least some degree of 
systemic similarities. For example, Grumm (1971) offered an index of legislative 
professionalism comprised of five variables: legislative compensation, length o f the 
session, expenditures for legislative services and operations, the number of bills 
introduced, and a “legislative services” based on the Citizens Conference of State 
Legislatures evaluation that was published in the same year. Other scholars followed 
(Leloup 1978; Bowman and Kearney 1986; Squire 1992), but for the most part, based 
their indices on the recommendations from the Citizens Conference of State Legislatures 
report (1971).
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The CCSL evaluation (1971) was perhaps the first effort to systematically evaluate 
state legislatures. In particular, their stated goals were to develop specific criteria for the 
evaluation of the technical capabilities o f the legislatures, and to collect data and rank the 
state legislatures according to those specific criteria. The purpose of such research was 
fourfold: first, to focus the attention and concern of the public on factors which may limit 
the effective performance of some state legislators; secondly, to furnish diagnostic 
indicators of particular deficiencies and to give guidance for improvement; third, to 
provide a benchmark with which to measure future improvements; finally, to generate 
discussion on what constitutes effective legislative organization and procedure (CCSL 
1971). The study developed the FAIIR (functional, accountable, informed, independent, 
representative) evaluation system, which consisted of five general platforms with sub­
platforms for each.
The first plank, function, is built upon six sub-platforms. First, the legislature must 
have adequate time and flexibility to manage their workload imposed upon it. Secondly, 
the legislature must adequate support staff, which may focus on specialized tasks (e.g., 
agency liaison) or more general tasks (e.g., clerical duties). Third, the legislature must 
have adequate facilities, such as chambers and committee rooms; fourth, the structure of 
the legislature must be such that there are neither too few nor too many standing 
committees, as well as assignments per committee. The fifth plank is that of procedures, 
which may include the use of occasional joint committees, or provisions for emergency 
measures; and finally, a legislature must contain leadership (though it should be diffuse 
and constrained) and bipartisan participation in various management aspects of 
operations, such as scheduling, space assignment, etc. (CCSL 1971).
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The second plank, accountability, consists of three components. First, the council 
argues that the form of the legislature be comprehensible, and this is achieved with 
single-member districting, selection of leaders by the full house, published rules and 
procedures, the availability of explicit institutions, devices, and documents for planning, 
budgeting and scheduling. Secondly, the council argues that public access to the 
institution is essential, both in terms o f actual physical access, as well as access to the 
proceedings. Finally, legislative accountability requires some degree of equality among 
members in the ability to influence legislation.
Third, the legislature must be informed; that is, the information it receives should be 
over and above that of executive agencies and interest groups -  and it should have the 
infrastructure in place to cultivate, manage, and deploy such information to the members. 
This can be buttressed by providing adequate pre-session time for review, by the use of 
standing committees for informational purposes, and improving the form and character of 
bill documents.
Fourth, legislatures should be independent. In particular, the legislature should enjoy 
autonomy in legislative activities (e.g., control over the frequency, duration, and agendas 
of legislative sessions, districting and apportionment plans) as well as from the executive 
branch. Moreover, an independent legislature should have oversight capabilities, 
lobbyists should be required to register (and this information should be transparent to the 
public), and conflicts of interest (e.g., holding multiple offices, employment of relatives, 
possibilities o f commercial ties between legislators and state or government officials) 
should be eliminated.
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Finally, the CCSL (1971) argues that the legislature should be representative. This 
includes a diverse legislature (in terms o f age, race, and backgrounds), as well as be 
effective (tempered by increased size of the legislature and concentrated leadership). 
Keeping in mind that the rankings are ordinal in their distribution, rather than interval or 
cardinal, the results are not surprising. In 1971, California was ranked as having the most 
professional legislature, with New York, Illinois, and Florida following. Alabama ranked 
fiftieth, while North Carolina, Delaware, and Wyoming ranked just above.
Perhaps more important for the purposes of this study, however, is the discussion 
regarding the “correlates of legislative capability.” In this section the CCSL (1971) 
reports correlations between regional/geographic factors, demographic/socioeconomic 
factors, historical/cultural factors, political factors and legislative capability in an effort to 
appropriate the significance o f their original rank-order findings of legislative 
professionalism. Many of the explanatory variables used here will also be used in the 
upcoming quantitative analysis, and will be discussed in greater detail then. Using 
Spearman’s rank-order correlation measurements, the CCSL’s findings can be summed 
as follows. First, they find that factors such as population size, population density, level 
of industrialization, and legislative centralization are not associated with legislative 
capability. Secondly, legislatures ranking high in capability are more likely to be in 
wealthier states, in states with professional legislatures, competitive and cohesive parties, 
and local governments. Third, legislative capability is inversely related to one-party 
dominance. Finally, regional clustering does exist, and is most pronounced in the north 
central (most capable) and Southeast (least capable).
Finally, the CCSL (1971) report argues that there are specific policy consequences 
for more capable and professional legislatures. In particular, they argue that “highly
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capable legislatures tend to be generally innovative in many different areas of public 
policy, generous in welfare and education spending and services...” (CCSL 1971: 77).
State legislatures have, for the most part, undergone an overall transformation 
towards professionalization in terms of increased support staff, benefits and pay, longer 
sessions, and more overall space (Morehouse and Jewell 2003; Rosenthal 1996). State 
legislative reforms may also have an effect on the motivation and incentives that potential 
candidates consider, and may result in an increase of “career” legislators (Maestes 2000). 
Indeed, the trend towards professionalization has led scholars to argue that the 
institutionalization of the institution of state legislatures is becoming more like that of the 
U.S. Congress, with King (2000) in particular noting that as of the date of his writing, 
legislatures operated with nearly three-fourths of the resources of a national legislature, 
compared to less than half in the 1960’s. In many states, increased legislative 
professionalism has led to term-limit movements, as the argument was made that 
legislators sought to take advantage of the increased in pay, staff, and resources by 
securing their positions in office, or by seeking advancement to higher office, rather than 
adequately attending to the needs of their constituents (King 2000).
State legislative professionalism has had (perhaps unintended) consequences. For 
example, the relationship between professional legislatures, progressive ambition, and 
legislative responsiveness was analyzed by Maestes (2000), who argued that 
professionalization was likely to attract legislators with progressive ambition who in turn 
would be more likely to identify and respond to the interests and concerns of their 
constituents. Thus, Maestes finds that states with more professional legislatures (and 
more advancement opportunities) have greater aggregate opinion-policy congruence 
while controlling for the effects of electoral competition and alternative policy influences.
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This is mainly because “progressively ambitious politicians seek to maximize political 
support over the long term across an expanding set of constituencies” (Maestes 2000, 
669) which in turn overcomes the notion that legislators may not be responsive to 
constituents even with the presence of non-competitive elections. Further, since 
progressive ambition for higher office often includes offices with wider geographical 
territories (and thus, more constituents), such legislators tend to balance the interests and 
policy preferences of these individuals as well. Thus, such that institutionalization of 
legislatures provides insulation for members, legislative outcomes in professional 
legislatures can still be more responsive to broad-based constituent preferences.
State legislative professionalism also varies widely across states. Morehouse and 
Jewell (2003) provide the intuitive argument that the larger states, such as California and 
New York, deal with varied populations and complex issues, and thus are likely to be 
more professional. However, other factors may be at work in determining the level of 
legislative professionalism within a given state. Mooney (1995) addresses this question 
directly, noting that the answer has meaningful implications: policy outputs and political 
processes are likely to be dependent upon the levels of professionalization within the 
state legislature. For Mooney, state legislative professionalism is affected by three 
general types o f influence: the economic and social characteristics of its citizens, the 
institutional structure of the state political system, and the polieies of peer states (Mooney
1995,49).
These three general types of influence are highly informative for the purposes of this 
work, and their details will be discussed here. First, Mooney argues that the economic 
and social characteristics of the state inform legislative professionalism as a function of 
the overall population level, the heterogeneity of the population, and the gross state
77
product per capita. In particular, a higher population is likely to lead to greater state 
financial resources (via an increased tax base via inereased personal and business 
income) with which to pay a more professional legislature. Increases in gross state 
product per c a p i t a a l s o  have a positive effect on legislative professionalism, for much 
the same reason. Additionally, the heterogeneity of the population will likely affect the 
levels of legislative professionalism, as the differences in values may make policy 
responsiveness more difficult to achieve, which in turn creates value for legislative 
professionalism.
Secondly, the institutional structure of the state political system is, for Mooney, 
highly influential in determining state level legislative professionalism. In particular, 
institutional structure refers to five individual variables: apportionment fairness, legal 
restrictions on legislative session length, opportunities for members to advance 
politically, the formal powers of the governor’s office, and bureaucracy size.
Court-ordered ends to state legislative malapportionment in the 1960s brought an 
end to legislatures that were dominated by rural interests primarily interested in 
maintaining the status quo (Mooney 1995, 50). Additionally, the presence of either a 
statute or constitutional amendment dictating legislative session length may affect 
professionalization (at least in terms of session length) as a constitutional amendment will 
likely require a referendum, while a statute will likely require only the approval of the 
governor. Mooney’s argument that the opportunity for advancement influences legislative 
professionalism supports Maestes’s (1995) (earlier-discussed) notion and can be passed
The author defines gross state product per capita as the measure of the average level of 
economic productivity of a state’s population, and as such, it is an indicator of state 
wealth independent of population.
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over here. Mooney considers the formal power of the governor’s office to be a factor 
because a more powerful executive branch will motivate the legislature to increase its 
capacity in an effort to maintain its influence in state policymaking; for Mooney, the 
bureaucracy of the state is similar in this regard. In other words, a less powerful executive 
branch and state bureaucracy requires fewer resources (and thus, less professionalization) 
to maintain the influence desired.
Third, Mooney argues that the policies o f “sister-states” are likely to be influential, 
insofar as the costs are likely to be less when a neighboring state has already adopted the 
policy; that those states are likely to serve as a sort o f “pilot-study”, which can be altered 
accordingly when instituted; and also that it is politically easier to follow another state in 
adopting policies rather than lead the way. Thus, legislative professionalism, at least for 
Mooney, may also be a function of proximity.
Mooney’s data analyses result in interesting findings. Mooney finds statistical 
support for his hypothesis that the state’s population size, political structures, and sister 
state’s professionalism all positively affect legislative professionalism, and after a time- 
series analysis, he also finds support for the notion that advancement opportunities, 
population heterogeneity, gross state product per capita, and gubernatorial power had 
positive effects on professionalization. Mooney concludes by noting that an increase in 
legislative professionalism does not necessarily mean that the balance of power would be 
shifted to legislatures only; indeed, governors, interest groups, courts, and local 
governments would also be strengthened (Mooney 1995:61).
If legislative professionalism can influence such things as incumbent reelection, 
interest groups, courts, local governments, the state bureaucracy as shown here, can it 
influence direct democracy? Perhaps. Gerber (1996, 1998) considers the role o f the
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initiative in affecting legislative behavior. In particular, she questions whether simply the 
“threat” of an initiative may influence legislative behavior. Insofar as legislators in states 
that allow initiatives are expected to pass laws that more closely reflect that state’s 
median voter’s preferences, Gerber determines that parental consent laws passed in 
initiative states do more closely reflect their state’s median voter preferences when 
compared to non-initiative states. The most salient aspect of her work may be the finding 
that interests groups can affect policy via the state legislature without actually proposing 
initiatives -  but simply by threatening them.
However, the relationship between state legislators and direct democracy may need 
to be first examined in simpler terms: that o f institutional structure. Insofar as policies are 
most likely to be determined by the state legislature, the structure of that institution 
(especially in terms of professionalization) may become an important predictor of state- 
level policy outcome. More important for the purposes of this thesis, however, is the 
notion that state level professionalization may also affect another policy aggregator: 
direct democracy. Such examinations are the focus of the following chapters.
Conclusions
The salient issues in direct democracy today are much the same as they were a 
century ago. Though the Progressive notion of direct democracy providing educative 
benefits to the citizenry proved elusive, the institution itself has presented itself as an 
opportunity for citizens to have increased access to the process. Thus, voters are equipped 
with a mechanism by which they may have a voice distinct from party allegiance, and by 
which they may have increased control over the agenda. Perhaps most prominently, the 
Progressive notion that the process of direct democracy would place a check on special
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interests (at least in terms of their power over the agenda, as well as on other institutions 
in the political arena) has proven not only unfounded, but also ill-conceived. Scholarship 
on direct democracy and policy outcomes suggest that states with the process generally 
have policies in place that are closer to the median voter’s preferences; moreover, the 
initiative and referenda appear to be the instrumental variable causing such an alliance. 
However, previous works have not taken the time to further parse out the underlying 
causes of such correlations. For example, institutional theory suggests that institutions in 
and of themselves do not cause outcomes; rather, institutions generally shape the political 
interactions. Since “veto points” provide strategic openings that actors use to achieve 
their goals, the structure of the institutional arrangement becomes paramount in 
understanding the nature of the influence of one institution (state legislatures) over 
another institution (direct democracy). While clearly the direction of influence could be 
studied in reverse (and such a project would be worthwhile), for the purposes o f this 
thesis, it will be limited to examining the structure of state legislatures (i.e., structure in 
terms of professionalization) in an attempt to understand the nature of its influence on 
direct democracy. Such examinations are the subject of the following chapters
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CHAPTER 4
DATA AND METHODS
The preceding chapters evaluated the current state of direct democracy relative to the 
expectations o f its founders in an attempt to understand how the process has evolved into 
an institution in its own right, as well as among other institutions within the political 
arena. While many of the founders intentions for the process of direct democracy were 
realized (e.g., increased control over the agenda, the ability to produce laws that 
“checked” the power of the state legislatures), others were not (e.g., breaking the hold of 
well-heeled special interest groups over the policymaking process). However, to fully 
understand the current relationship of these three entities, a more detailed analysis is in 
order. Because the proper operationalization of variables is the hallmark of quantitative 
research, this chapter serves as an exploration of the variables used to examine the 
influence o f state legislative professionalism on the institution of direct democracy. In 
particular, this chapter reviews the research question of this thesis, outlines the 
hypotheses to be tested, and concludes with an in-depth examination of the variables used 
in the upcoming analysis.
8 2
Research Question
This thesis focuses on the following question: what is the influence o f state legislative 
professionalism on the institution of direct democracy? While the natural relationship 
between these two entities may seem indirect and distant at first, the analysis completed 
in chapter two of this thesis should fully illuminate the often entwined relationship that 
these two entities have. In states that allow direct democracy, the citizens of that state 
have recourse available to them when the state legislature is seen as unresponsive - or 
perhaps, out o f touch with - the perceived needs of the citizens. For social scientists, the 
question should focus less on what “unresponsive” may actually mean and more on what 
the likelihood o f one event causing another event to occur is. Thus, for the purposes of 
this thesis, state legislative professionalism will serve as the (testable) intervening 
variable in measuring the frequency and type of direct democracy initiatives appearing on 
the ballots in the American states.
Hypotheses
The main hypothesis (HI) of this thesis is that increased state legislative 
professionalism will result in initiatives appearing more frequently on statewide ballots. 
On a superficial level o f analysis, the notion that legislative professionalism would result 
in increased ballot initiative activity across states may seem counterintuitive: insofar as 
professionalization should result in increased capacity to serve the needs of the citizenry, 
the perception would be that the people would seek other access points (such as the 
initiative) less frequently in states that have increased legislative professionalization. That 
is, if  the legislature is more professional, then the citizenry should not adopt the 
Progressive notion of having to resort to the initiative as a “check” on the state
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legislatures; nor should they have to adopt the Populist notion of having to resort to the 
initiative to radically alter the status quo and seek legislation on their own. Indeed, a 
professional legislature would (ideally) be professional enough to meet the needs of the 
citizenry such that excessive use of the initiative would not be necessary.
However, scholars have recently begun to question this seemingly utopian description 
o f the relationship between professionalized state legislatures and direct democracy. In 
particular, Banducci (1998) argues that there are two main reasons why increased ballot 
initiative activity is more likely to occur in states where the legislatures are more 
professional. First, because legislatures are more professional, the campaigns are likely to 
be more expensive, as the seats are likely to be more desirable. Increased campaign 
expenses are likely to force the legislator to rely on increased interest group 
contributions. In this situation, Banducci argues that legislators are going to be less likely 
to favor one interest group over another, which in turn leads the groups to pursue their 
agendas via the initiative. Secondly, Banducci argues that more professional legislatures 
are likely to have “larger” agendas, which raises public expectations, but also increases 
the difficulty in achieving objectives. This, she argues, could lead a dissatisfied public to 
turn to the initiative.
Banducci's arguments are well-received and in large part form the foundation of this 
work. However, the notion that legislators are less likely to favor one interest group over 
another simply because they seek increased contributions from a wider array of groups is 
problematic. In particular, this situation is highly dependent upon the arrangements of 
interest groups in a particular state. That is, in states in which few interest groups 
populate the political arena, legislators are likely to going to strongly favor one group 
over another. Though Banducci’s expectations regarding this relationship may be met in
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States wherein a signifieant number of groups exist, the likelihood of a state legislator 
winning reeleetion in a state with a limited number of interest groups declines rapidly 
when sueh a legislator does not favor one group over another. Additionally, Banducei 
may imply more competition than aetually exists; legislators may not have to ehoose one 
group over another; the notion of pluralism suggests that different groups pursue different 
poliey areas; thus, legislators may rarely have to ehoose one group over another.
Banducci’s suggestions notwithstanding, the theoretical expectations of the 
institutionalist theory may provide a more efficient foundation for the hypothesis to be 
tested here. That is, the relationship between the state legislature and the institution of 
direet demoeraey is based on a struetural explanation, and the institutionalist theory 
focuses on the structural relationship between institutions - thus, as explained in the 
seeond ehapter, the notion that legislative professionalism may be seen as a sort of “veto 
point” that political actors use to aehieve their goals (within the eontext of institutional 
dynamism).
This notion expands on Banducci’s (1998) argument in that increased interest group 
activity (and by extension, increased ballot initiative activity) is associated with increased 
legislative professionalism but does not provide for legislator action as a basis for interest 
groups pursuing the initiative. Instead, the concept foeuses more on the sourees of 
institutional dynamism previously discussed as a catalyst for action among individuals or 
groups in the political arena. In other words, by eoneepmalizing the professionalization of 
state legislatures as a change in the political balance of power, and noting that this facet 
of institutional dynamism suggests that old institutions (in this case, the institution of 
direct democracy) are put into service of different ends (through “veto points”), the
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notion of increased legislative professionalism being associated with higher levels of 
ballot initiative activity becomes clearer.
A secondary hypothesis (H2a) of this study involves the professionalization of the 
state legislatures and the types of initiatives appearing on statewide ballots here. 
Specifically, I hypothesize that more professional legislatures will have increased ballot 
initiatives dealing with governmental processes, such as term limits or tax-and- 
expenditure limitations. Moreover, I hypothesize that the same effect will hold when 
considering initiatives dealing with economic issues (H2b), as well as with social and 
moral issues (H2c). The root of this hypothesis is formed along the same lines as the first 
hypothesis.
Data
The dataset for this analysis is comprised of citizen-sponsored initiatives appearing 
on the ballots of twenty-two states' over the ten year period of 1990-2000. These pooled, 
cross-sectional data are organized by year, and then by state. In other words, a “case” 
consists of the total number of initiatives appearing on the ballot in a given year. While 
the majority of states hold statewide elections in even-numbered years, a handful of states
' Though twenty-four states have the initiative process available to them, two were 
eliminated from analysis: Nebraska and Illinois. Nebraska has a unicameral, non-partisan 
legislature which presents problems for measuring professionalism as an influence on 
direct democracy when other control variables (such as divided government) are 
included; Illinois did not have any ballot measures during the entire decade.
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hold additional statewide elections in off-years as well , and thus, the final number of 
cases is 145.
Model Specification
The hypotheses discussed here will be tested using two separate models. For H I, the 
dependent variable will be the number of initiatives appearing on a statewide ballot in a 
given election year. Given the structure of the dependent variable (namely, a count 
variable), the best available method to analyze the data is Poisson regression. However, 
while initial tests show that the data resemble a Poisson distribution, these same tests also 
revealed over-dispersion^ within the dependent variable. As Long and Freese (2006) 
explain, the best approach to over-dispersion is to use an alternate regression model: 
negative binomial regression. In particular, the model will be tested using negative 
binomial regression with robust standard errors clustered on years. The clustering allows 
for the reduction in the standard error that may arise from similarities across states 
regarding ballot initiatives. In other words, several salient issues found a place on the 
ballot of several states in similar years: term-limit questions dominated ballot in the mid- 
1990s; as did tax-and-expenditure limitation questions and medical marijuana. The use of 
robust standard errors clustered on years helps to overcome the statistical requirement 
that all observations be independent of one another.
 ̂ Maine held statewide elections in each year between 1990-2000; Washington held 
elections in each year except 1999; Mississippi held statewide elections in 1995 and 
1999.
 ̂ Over-dispersion occurs when the variance of the distribution significantly exceeds the 
mean of the distribution. In this case, the mean of the distribution was 3.4; the variance 
was 13.5.
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For H2a, H2b, and H2c, the dependent variable will be the number of each type of 
initiative appearing on the statewide ballot in a given year. In order to reduce the 
subjectivity involved in categorizing the variables into economic, social/moral, and 
governmental process, the dependent variables are categorized into the three groups using 
a two-stage process. First, I use the standardized categories assigned to each initiative by 
the National Conference of State Legislatures. The NCSL uses a total of twenty-seven 
different categories, although several o f them are rarely used. From there, I assigned each 
of the twenty-seven categories a (1) if  it dealt primarily with an economic issue, a (2) if  it 
dealt primarily with social/moral issues, and a (3) if  it dealt with governmental processes. 
The end result collapsed the twenty-seven categories into three general categories.'* Since 
these data are also expressed as count variables, and over-dispersion is again present 
among them, negative binomial regression will also be used to test these hypotheses.
Main Independent Variable: State Legislative Professionalization 
The main independent variable will be a measure of legislative professionalization for 
each state over the decade. To be sure, defining and operationalizing legislative 
professionalism has been the subject of many scholarly works over the past few deeades 
(Grumm 1971; CCSL 1971; Leloup 1978; Bowman and Kearney 1988; Weber, Tucker 
and Brace 1991; Squire 1992; Van Dunk and Weber 1997), though Mooney (1994) offers 
a succinct definition of the term: “[sjtate legislative professionalism refers to the 
enhancement of the capacity of the legislature to perform its role in the policymaking
Many initiatives deal with several topics, and some overlap between the three categories 
may occur. The subjectivity of this process has not been ignored. During the re-coding 
phase, the text of each initiative was analyzed to ensure proper placement into the three 
categories, and care was taken to ensure that the initiative was placed in the category that 
best fit the description. See Appendix 1 for details.
process with an expertise, seriousness, and effort comparable to that of other actors in the 
proeess” (Mooney 1994: 71). In the same work, Mooney also considers the proper 
operationalization of state legislative professionalism by evaluating five indices provided 
over the years by different scholars^. Mooney finds that the pairwise coefficients between 
four of the five indices examined are quite high,^ though Squire’s (1992) index of 
legislative professionalism is deemed superior, especially when considering cases across 
time, as this thesis does.
There are several advantages to Squire’s index of legislative professionalism. First, 
Squire (1992) developed his measure of professionalization by using “relevant attributes 
of Congress as a baseline against which to compare those same attributes in other 
legislative bodies” (Squire 1992; 71). In particular, Squire focused on three simple 
attributes: member pay, staff members per legislator, and total days in session. Mooney 
(1994) argues that this methodology facilitates cross-year comparisons because the 
ratings are based on a common standard; as such, a state’s score on this index is 
“dependent only on its level on these variables as compared to Congress, and the level or 
variability of other states on them has no influence on its score” (Mooney 1994: 75). 
Moreover, Mooney argues that while the other indices may have measured 
professionalism on more than these three (perhaps overly simplistic) variables, the high
 ̂ In particular, Mooney evaluates the first widely used index, developed by John Grumm
(1971); a similar but slightly expanded index developed by Morehouse (1983) the widely 
cited index provided by the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures (1971); an index 
developed by Bowman and Kearney (1988) that focused on the objective measurements, 
such as committee assignments and overall legislative size; and a tripartite index 
developed by Peverill Squire (1992).
® The lowest pairwise correlation coefficient between these four variables is .767; the 
highest is .865. The weaker correlation occurs between the CCSL (described above) and 
the other four indices.
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correlation between this index and the more comprehensive indices suggests a high 
degree of validity within Squire’s (1992) index. Given the strength of Mooney’s 
empirical analysis, this thesis will utilize Squire’s (1992) index of legislative 
professionalism as the main independent variable.^
Control Variables
A properly specified model is a critical step in obtaining parameter estimates that one 
can be confident in. Towards that end, the two models presented here make use o f a 
number of important control variables. The first of the two models considers the 
influence of legislative professionalism on the frequency of initiatives appearing on 
statewide ballots. Thus, I first implement a control variable that considers the strength of 
interest groups within a given state.
The interest group strength index used here was developed by Hrebnar and Thomas 
(2002) and ranks state-level interest group performance among five categories: dominant, 
dominant/complementary, complementary, complementary/subordinate, and subordinate. 
For the purposes o f this thesis, the categories were ranked one through five, with 
subordinate as one and dominate as five^. Hrebnar and Thomas find that that interest 
groups (as a whole, rather than categorized by sector or purpose) listed in the dominant 
category had an overwhelming and consistent influence on public policymaking. A clear 
example of this would be Nevada (the collective effects of gaming and mining interests).
 ̂Squire’s (1992) index was developed using data for the early 1990’s. Though this thesis 
encompasses a period of ten years (1990-2000) Mooney (1994) argues that “the relative 
position of states on legislative professionalism has not changed greatly over the last 
thirty years” and thus, the index should provide an adequate level of professionalization 
over the period included in this study.
* Hrebnar and Thomas do not use this ordered type of index; it was created by this author 
to facilitate statistical analysis.
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The “eomplementary” eategory indicates that groups do not overly dominate the process, 
but rather are limited in their ability to influenee poliey, and instead work in tandem with 
other aspects of the political system in a given state. Though no state has -  now or ever -  
been ranked as having subordinate interest groups, this eategory would obviously indieate 
that groups within that state have little to no power in influencing state poliey.
The advantages of this index are threefold. First, the authors developed the index 
using both qualitative and quantitative methods involving questionnaires and interviews 
with state public officials and exploring and expanding on current literature in the 
diseipline. This allows for the strengths of prior research to present itself here. Secondly, 
the study assessed overall interest group power in all fifty states on five oeeasions (1985, 
1989, 1994, 1998, and 2002). This methodology benefits this study in two ways: first, it 
has considered interest group power before, during, and after the period eovered by this 
work; secondly, trend analysis shows that the ratings are quite stable over time, in terms 
of both types of group making an overall impaet, as well as the overall strength rating 
(Thomas and Hrebner 2002: 118). This suggests that using a single five-fold index across 
the period of 1990-2000 will not contaminate the statistieal parameters. Third, the index 
eonsiders the group power of speeial interests, rather than a simple measure of the 
number o f interest groups in a given state. The result is a better indieation of how 
powerful (and thus, more likely to be suceessful) interest groups are within a given state. 
This prohibits undue influence on the statistieal model used here from single issue groups 
that may achieve prominence due to inereased (but perhaps short-term) issue saliency 
(e.g., term-limit or gay-marriage movements).
Seeondly, I eontrol for variation in the level of diffieulty of having an initiative 
placed on the ballot. Signifieant variation exists between states in areas sueh as quantity
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of signature requirements, geographic restrictions governing signature requirements, the 
time required to circulate a petition, whether statutes may be allowed or if  the voters are 
limited to constitutional amendments, and subject matter requirements (Magelby 1984; 
Tolbert, Lowenstein, and Donovan 1998; Cronin 1989). Bowler and Donovan (2004b) 
provide an excellent index of qualification difficulty that considers each of these 
components and is relevant to the period under consideration^.
Third, I control for variations in population that may affect the number o f questions 
appearing on a statewide ballot. Clearly, the population of California (especially when 
considered in the context of their well-known penchant for direct democracy) should be 
controlled for'°. Along these same lines, state-level gross domestic product is also 
included as a control variable to account for differences that may occur between states 
that use the initiative process but have significant differences in industrial output. Indeed, 
Mooney (1995) argues that both population and state gross domestic product may 
(independently) produce differences in state legislative professionalization, and thus 
provides justification for their inclusion as control variables. Population data are taken 
from the U.S. Census Bureau; state level gross domestic product data are taken from the 
U.S. Department o f Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
® In particular, the authors assign a higher score (indicating increased difficulty) to a state 
if  only statutes or only constitutional amendments are allowed; if  the length o f the 
qualifying period is limited; if  a higher geographic distribution of signatures is required; 
if  the signature requirement is between 7-10%; if the signature requirement exceeds 10%; 
if substantive limits are in place regarding the subject matter of initiatives (Bowler and 
Donovan 2004: 138).
It should be noted that increased population does not automatically lead to an increase 
in ballot initiatives. In the five statewide elections that occurred between 1990-2000, 
California voters decided seventy-one initiatives; however, in the same period Oregon 
voters (with nearly one-tenth of the population) decided seventy-three.
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Fourth, I consider institutional factors by controlling for different levels of divided 
government. In particular, the data have been coded for divided government on two 
levels: between chambers within the state legislature, and between the state legislature 
and the executive branch. In order for the legislature and the exeeutive to be considered 
divided, both chambers of the legislature must have had majorities from the same party 
while the executive belonged to another party. In the case o f an evenly-split ehamber in 
the legislature, the arrangement was eonsidered divided. Independents were coded 
according to their leanings, as provided by the Book o f  States^ ̂ . Thus, an Independent- 
leaning-Republican was coded as a Republican.'^
Additional control variables populate the seeond model that focuses on the type 
(rather than the frequency) of initiatives appearing on statewide ballots. Considering 
frequeney and type are wholly independent of eaeh other, while some of the same control 
variables will be used in the latter as in the former, they should be considered as 
neeessary but not sufficient to fully explain variation in the new model.
Examining the types of initiative that appear on statewide ballots -  and to be more 
preeise, attempting to explain the causes behind their appearance -  can be a daunting 
task. To properly understand why more social/moral issues may appear on a partieular 
state’s ballot more often than another state, or why économie issues appear more 
frequently in one state over another, the researeher must have (at the very least) a general 
understanding of the citizens (and in particular, the political “culture”) of the given state.
' ' All data used to construct the divided government variable was taken from the Book o f  
States (various editions).
Between 1990-2000, only two governors were labeled as independent; both were 
eonsidered “leaning Republican”: Alaska’s Walter Hickel (1990-1994) and Maine’s 
Angus King (1995-2003).
93
Operationalizing such a variable, however, is fraught with peril. In an attempt to 
overcome these dangers, I have included three variables to account for state-level 
political culture and ideology.
First, I turn to a long-respected measure of political culture defined by Daniel Elazar
(1972). Elazar’s central thesis is that states are essentially civil societies within a larger 
political society. As such, Elazar argues that while contesting groups within the state’s 
civil society may find that they occasionally have more in common with members of 
other states, there are many more intrastate substantive issues that concern the majority of 
citizens within a given state. For the purposes of this thesis, the importance lies in 
Elazar’s argument that these interests generally concern a large portion of the population, 
but not necessarily the interest of the “state” itself (Elazar 1972:10). At the same time, 
differences in “political culture” exist among states. In this sense, political culture is 
defined as “particular patterns of orientation to political action”, and is “rooted in the 
cumulative historical experiences of particular groups of people” (Elazar 1972:89). Since 
states operate as civil societies within a larger civil society, Elazar argues that variations 
exist in state-level responses to the federalist system processes. In other words, different 
states view the relationship between the states and the federal system in different ways, 
and these variations can be explained in terms of a state’s political culture. Elazar argues 
that that there are three political cultures at work: individualistic, moralistic, and 
traditionalistic.
To be more precise, Elazar argues that the three political cultures presented reflect a 
synthesis of two fundamental conceptions of the American political order: the first is a 
political order conceived of as a marketplace, wherein public relationships are the 
products of bargaining among individuals and groups acting out of self-interest; the
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second is a political order conceived o f as a commonwealth -  a “state in which the whole 
people have an undivided interest -  in which the citizens cooperate in an effort to create 
and maintain the best government in order to implement certain shared moral principles” 
(Elazar 1972:91). Finally, Elazar adds that a particular civil society’s conceptions o f the 
“uses of power and the nature of justice” are important aspects of its political culture.”
To illustrate, Elazar describes an individualistie political culture as one in which there 
is limited intervention into private activities in an effort to allow widespread access to the 
marketplace. The moralistic political culture, however, focuses less on the marketplace 
and more on the commonwealth as the purpose of government, and in this sense, politics 
is viewed as a tool to translate “power” for the betterment of the commonwealth. In this 
ease, politicians “serve the community,” and thus, issues often set the agenda for political 
actors. In particular, government is considered “a positive instrument with a 
responsibility to promote the general welfare” (Elazar 1972: 97). Finally, the 
traditionalistic political culture both views the marketplace with “ambivalence” and 
views the commonwealth with a “paternalistic and elitist conception.” Although the 
traditionalistic culture shares with the moralistic culture the view that good governance 
means involvement in the community, the focus shifts to maintaining the existing social 
order through eonfming politieal power to an elite few.
It has long been understood that while Elazar’s work is highly impressionistic, its 
contribution to the discipline has been well-received, and despite its age, is still used 
today (Fitzpatrick and Hero, 1988; Gray and Lowery 2004). Though the work lacks an 
interval level variable to include, others (Sharkansky 1969) have expanded his work such 
that an interval level index has been achieved. Following Cook, Jelen and Wilcox (1993), 
I have adapted the interval level variable for use in this dataset.
95
Secondly, I include a variable of state-level (self-reported) ideology as developed by 
Wright, Melver, and Erikson (1993). These authors have aggregated the results of 
CBS/New York Times national polls between 1976-2003, and in partieular provide a 
measure o f the pereentage of self-deseribed liberals, moderates, and eonservatives at the 
state level. Such a measure should provide excellent eontrol for state-level ideology, and 
in particular, help to eontrol for differences in all three categories (e.g., eeonomie, 
soeial/moral, and governmental proeess initiatives examined.) To faeilitate proper 
statistical analysis, the reported levels of ideology were taken on a year-by-year basis 
(1990-2000) and added to the dataset.
Finally, I inelude an index o f religious attitudes at the state level. Because religious 
identifieations have been shown to be highly eorrelated with partisan identifications, 
inclusion of such a variable will further control for differences in the population. 
Moreover, Cook, Jelen and Wileox (1993, 771) suggest that residents of different states 
hold political opinions that are significantly different, even after controlling for 
demographic variables. In sueh a ease, religious attitudes may help to explain differences 
in values and orientations towards salient issues that appear on ballot initiatives. The 
index was created by collapsing state-level religious participation data derived from the 
Ameriean Religious Identifieation Survey into three groups: Mainline Protestants, 
Evangelical Protestants, and Catholics’ .̂ To facilitate data analysis, I present the variable 
as a pereentage of Evangelicals within a given state.
The ARIS breaks down the religious participation data into twenty-four denominations 
(e.g., Chureh of Christ, Pentecostal, Church o f God, etc). Following Jelen and Chandler 
(1996), I have assigned eaeh eategory to one of the three groups listed here. See 
Appendix two for details.
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Conclusions
The current chapter seeks to build on the prior chapters concerning the influence of 
one institution (the state legislatures) over another (direct democracy) while considering 
other actors in the political arena (the state population, as well as interest-groups) within 
the context of the institutionalist theory. In so doing, this chapter outlines the relevant 
variables required to conduct a robust quantitative analysis. A properly specified model is 
a eritieal component in achieving confidence in the parameter estimates provided by sueh 
quantitative teehniques as negative binomial regression. The following ehapter will 
undertake these analyses.
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA ANALYSIS
The focus of this chapter is the testing of the two main hypotheses outlined in the 
previous chapter. To briefly review, I hypothesize that increases in legislative 
professionalism will result in an overall increase in the frequeney of initiatives appearing 
on statewide ballots (HI). On a secondary level, I also hypothesize that inereased 
legislative professionalism will increase the number of governmental proeess initiatives 
appearing on statewide ballots (H2a), as well as inerease the number of social/moral 
issues (H2b) and also economic issues (H2c).
As discussed earlier, the dependent variable is the number o f initiatives appearing on 
statewide ballots for the period 1990-2000, organized by year. Thus, a single year 
eonstitutes a case, while each case has the eorresponding number o f initiatives appearing 
on the ballot in that year. Though most states that have the proeess available to them did 
have initiatives appearing on the ballot in eaeh of the statewide eleetions during the 
decade, some did not, and were eounted as zero’. Since the dependent variable is a eount 
variable, and because events occur within a specific time period, the methodology of 
choice is Poisson regression (Lawless 1987). However, initial deseriptive statistical tests
’ Illinois did not have any initiatives appear on the ballot in the 1990’s, and so was 
excluded entirely from this study.
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revealed a possible complication. Specifically, Poisson regression assumes an equal mean 
and variance for the dependent variable. Inspection o f the dependent variable (tbe number 
o f questions per year, per state) reveals a significant difference between the mean and 
variance; such a situation is termed over-dispersion. As Long and Freese (2006, 376) 
point out, if  over-dispersion is present, estimates from the Poisson regression model are 
inefficient with standard errors that are biased downwards, regardless of proper model 
specification. As tbis is clearly tbe case witb tbese data, I follow Long and Freese (2006) 
and adopt negative binomial regression in order to analyze these data.
Hypothesis 1 Results
Table 4.1 presents tbe results for hypothesis 1: the frequency of ballot initiatives as 
the dependent variable; legislative professionalism as the main independent variable, and 
initiative qualification difficulty, state-level interest group strength, state-level gross 
domestic product, and population as control variables.
As expected, state legislative professionalism appears to positively influence tbe 
frequency of initiatives appearing on statewide ballots. Moreover, the magnitude of the 
coefficient suggests that the influence is quite strong, when holding all other variables 
constant. Indeed, a unit increase in legislative professionalism increases tbe expected 
number of initiatives in a given state by a factor of 4.5; to be more precise, a one standard 
deviation unit increase in legislative professionalism increases tbe expected initiatives in 
a given state by 1.29.
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TABLE 5.1 
HYPOTHESIS 1
FREQUENCY OF STATEWIDE INITIATIVES
Variable Coefficient Robust S.E Z-Score Significance
Legislative Prof 1.506 0.527 236 0,004
Qualification Diff -0.423 0.022 -19.13 (1000
Interest Grp Strength 0.371 0.110 3.37 0.001
State GDP &280 2.230 -1.18 0238
Population -2.630 (L830 fr92 0358
Constant 1.215 0323 3Y6 0.000
ln(o!) -1.160
a 0 J I3
N 145
G- &000
Note: Robust standard error statistic clustered by year.
As expected, for eaeh unit inerease in the qualification difficulty index, the expected 
number o f initiatives decreases by a factor of 0.6, which translates to a decrease of 
34.5%. Also as expected, as interest group strength in a given state increases, so do the 
n u m b er of expected initiatives, in this case by a factor of 1.45, or 29%^. Neither 
population nor state-level GDP had a statistically significant impact on the frequeney of
The statistical program used to run these analyses (Stata, V.IO) provided the 
additional calculations for these data by utilizing the Tistcoef ’ command.
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ballot initiatives. Before considering the result for legislative professionalism, further 
analysis may be in order.
Table 5.2 presents a similar model but with additional variables. I include a control 
variable for a divided legislature, and another representing divided government between 
the legislature and the exeeutive.
TABLE 5.2 
HYPOTHESIS 1 
FREQUENCY OF STATEWIDE E4ITIATIVES 
DIVIDED GOVERNMENT
Variable Coefficient Robust S.E Z-Score Significance
Legislative Prof 1.370 0359 2.08 0337
Qualification Diff -0.407 0356 -724 0300
Interest Grp Strength 0326 0T28 235 0.011
State GDP <1760 7A20 0.91 0362
Population -2320 2.710 -1.04 0299
Div Legislature 0.070 0T73 0.40 0.686
Div Leg/Exee 0T34 0T68 (180 0.423
Constant 1.930 0370 3.23 0.001
ln(a) -1.199
a 0.301
N 145
&000
Note: Robust standard error statistic clustered by year.
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Interestingly, divided government does not appear to play a contributing factor in the 
frequeney o f statewide ballot initiatives. When holding all other variables constant, 
neither variable achieves statistical significance. Moreover, the inclusion of divided 
government as a eontrol variable does not significantly change the direction or magnitude 
o f the main independent variable, suggesting that legislative professionalism contributes 
to inereased ballot initiative activity regardless of the level o f policy gridlock that may or 
may not be oeeurring because o f divided government.
Further analysis supports the notion that divided government has little apparent 
effect on the frequeney of statewide initiatives. Table 5.3 considers the opposite 
condition; a united legislature and exeeutive branch -  in this case, with the Democrats in 
eontrol.
In this case, the presence of a united government -  a Democrat-controlled 
government -  leads to a slight decrease in statewide initiatives. However, the magnitude 
of the coefficient suggests that, while statistically significant, the effect is minimal. When 
replaced by a variable measuring a Republican majority in both branches, the relationship 
becomes insignificant. Interestingly, this pattern holds when isolating the legislature.
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TABLE 5.3 
HYPOTHESIS 1 
FREQUENCY OF STATEWIDE INITIATIVE 
LEGISLATURE/EXEC UNITED -  D
Variable Coefficient Robust S.E Z-Score Significance
Legislative Prof I.5I2 0308 238 0.003
Qualification Diff -0.412 0320 -20.61 0.000
Interest Grp Strength 0366 0.100 335 0300
State GDP 6.501 7.406 038 0380
Population -2320 2334 -1.26 0209
Leg/Exec United- D -0.223 0.089 -249 0.013
Constant 1.224 0319 332 0.000
ln(o!) -1.191 .0.290
a 0302 (1879
N 145
3263 6366
Note: Robust standard error statistic clustered by year.
A Democrat-led legislature results (Table 5.4) in decreases in the frequency of 
ballot initiatives; a Republican-led legislature results (Table 5.5) in increases in the 
frequency of ballot initiatives, and though the coefficient is not statistically significant 
beyond the .05 level, it is significant beyond the less-stringent .10 level.
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TABLE 5.4 
HYPOTHESIS 1 
FREQUENCY OF STATEWIDE INITIATIVES 
LEGISLATURE UNITED -  D
Variable Coefficient Robust S.E Z-Score Significance
Legislative Prof L592 0328 3.01 0303
Qualification Diff -0.387 0322 -17.54 0300
Interest Grp Strength 0.317 0.094 335 0.001
State GDP 5260 6340 029 (1428
Population -1.991 2.410 -032 0.410
Legislature United - D -0.261 (1067 -335 0300
Constant 1.281 0306 4.16 0300
In(û') -1.17 0285
a 0309 0388
N 145
3263 &666
Note: Robust standard error statistie clustered by year.
These results support prior findings (Bandueeil998) diseussed earlier , as well as the 
hypothesis suggested here. That is, inereased levels o f legislative professionalism are 
associated with inereased ballot initiative activity.
 ̂ Banducci (1998) directly considers the role o f state legislative professionalism on the 
institution of direet demoeraey; moreover, the author finds that state legislative 
professionalism is assoeiated with inereased ballot initiative frequeney. However, 
Bandueei did not use a regression teehnique best suited to eount data whieh may have 
biased the parameter estimates; additionally, the control variables included in this study 
were expanded upon from the Banducci work.
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TABLE 5.5 
HYPOTHESIS 1 
FREQUENCY OF STATEWIDE INITIATIVES 
LEGISLATURE UNITED -  R
Variable Coefficient Robust S.E Z-Score Significance
Legislative Prof L762 0383 4.61 0.000
Qualification Diff -0390 (1018 -21.20 0.000
Interest Grp Strength 0.391 0.099 T94 0.000
State GDP 6.091 5.651 L08 0281
Population -2301 2.042 -138 0.170
Legislature United - R 0 299 0.163 133 0.067
Constant 0366 0.317 223 0.006
ln(o) -1.224 .0332
a 0296 0.098
N 145
G- 362& &000
Note: Robust standard error statistie elustered by year.
Hypothesis 2 Results
The understanding that inereased legislative professionalism leads to increased ballot 
initiative activity almost naturally leads to curiosity o f whether certain types of ballot 
initiatives appear more frequently given increases in legislative professionalism. The 
following seetion examines this relationship. As discussed earlier, this thesis seeks to 
improve our understanding of how one institution (state legislative professionalism) 
influences direet demoeraey. In the eontext of eomparative state politics, the question of 
what types o f initiatives are appearing on the ballot seeks explanation. The following
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multivariate model relies on the frequency o f three types of initiatives appearing on 
statewide ballots as individual dependent variables: economic initiatives, social/moral 
initiatives, and governmental proeess initiatives. Though the eategorization used here 
seems overly broad, the objeetive is to gain a probabilistie understanding of the 
relationship between the two institutions. By first understanding the broad-based nature 
o f the relationship using the analyses presented here, more subtle distinetions regarding 
subeategories o f initiatives ean be extrapolated from the results. In other words, if  a 
relationship is found between inereased legislative professionalism and increased 
governmental proeess initiatives, then one ean, with inereased eonfidenee, assume that 
such initiatives as expenditure limitations, term limitations, and redistrieting initiatives 
would also see inereases. It is expeeted that this teehnique would apply to eaeh of the 
three eategories.
Table 5.6 displays the results o f the hypothesis"’. Surprisingly, inereased legislative 
professionalism does not produee statistieally significant differences in the types of 
initiatives appearing on statewide ballots, when holding all other variables eonstant. 
Given the strength, direction, and magnitude o f the coefficient in the prior model, this is 
puzzling. However, it may be useful to briefly diseuss the results of the table before 
exploring the relationship between legislative professionalism and types of initiatives 
appearing on statewide ballots.
Neither political culture nor state-level ideology was measured for Alaska, and thus the 
N is reduced to 137.
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TABLE 5.6 
HYPOTHESES 2a, 2b, and 2c 
TYPE OF INITIATIVES APPEARING ON STATEWIDE BALLOTS
Variable GovernmentalProcess
Social/Moral Economic
Legislative 0.561 0235 301
Prof (1.318) 01915) (0.868)
Qualification
Difficulty -0.301(0.077)***
-0.419
(0.110)***
-0.499
(0.063)***
Interest Grp 
Strength 0379(0.176)**
0.438
(0.207)**
0.142
(0.283)
Divided
Government - 0.017 -0395 0342
Legislature (0.262) (0.190) (0.207)
Divided 
Government -  
Leg/Executive
0.141
01239)
0381
(0.164)**
-0.114
(0.289)
Political
Culture
-0.031 -0289 0.019
(0.058) (0.103)** (0.427)
Conservatives -0.005(0.026)
-0.024
01029)
-0.046
01315)***
Population 245(2.17)
2.45
(1.68)
2.70
(1.32)
Constant 0.092 1.49 254(1.33) (1.42) 01793)
In(ct) -1.217
-1.934
(1.24)
-0.773
0335
0296 0.144 0.461a (0.178) (0.154)
N 137 137 137
Note:. Entries are negative binomial coefficients with robust standard errors (clustered by
year) in parenthesis.
*p<.05. **p<.01. *** p<.001
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First, the most notable eharacteristic of the table is the uniformity -  and statistical 
significance of -  the qualifieation diffieulty variable. As was the ease with the prior 
model, inereased qualification difficulty leads to a uniform decrease in ballot initiatives 
aeross states, and across types of initiatives. In and of itself however, this is neither 
surprising nor novel.
Seeondly, increased interest group strength shows a similar eoeffieient direetion and 
strength in this model (however, this relationship fails to hold when eonsidering 
economic types o f initiatives). Thus, it ean be dedueed from this analysis that inereased 
qualifieation diffieulty has a negative effeet on the overall frequeney of initiatives, 
regardless of type, while inereased interest group strength leads to an inerease in both 
governmental proeess initiatives as well as social/moral initiatives, though not eeonomie 
initiatives.
Interestingly, this relationship may present a slightly new angle on a well-deseribed 
phenomenon within the institution of direet demoeraey. As several scholars (e.g., 
Donovan et al. 1998; Gerber 1999) argue, broad-based interest groups are mueh more 
likely to see success at getting initiatives placed on the ballot, while eeonomie interest 
groups are mueh more likely to attempt to maintain the status quo by defeating initiatives 
already plaeed on the ballot. Though these analyses do not attempt to delineate between 
the types of interest groups at work, the notion that interest group strength fails to predict 
increased eeonomie initiatives may be an indicator that (economic) interest groups are not 
attempting to pursue eeonomie initiatives, but rather eonfronting them after they have 
already been plaeed on the ballot.
Third (and similar to the prior model), divided government does not appear to be a 
signifieant predietor of inereased ballot initiative activity, except for the relationship
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between social/moral initiatives and divided legislature and executive braneh. Here, the 
analysis reveals that such a division does result in an increase in the expeeted initiatives 
dealing with social/moral issues, when holding all other variables eonstant. Fourth, the 
political culture also has a statistically significant relationship on social/moral initiative 
activity. The data are coded in an interval level format, such that increases in the interval 
designate a state moving farther away from the moralistic political culture and towards 
the traditionalistic political culture. Thus, as a state moves closer towards the 
traditionalistic end of the political culture spectrum, the result is a decrease in the 
social/moral initiative activity. Given Elazar’s description o f the traditionalistic culture^ 
the direction o f this coefficient is not surprising, and further confirms the validity of 
Elazar’s longstanding work.
Finally, an interesting result is found in the “conservatives” variable, when 
eonsidering eeonomie initiatives. This variable measures the amount of self-deseribed 
conservatives in a given state; though the magnitude of the coefficient is not large, a 
statistieally significant relationship does present itself: an inerease in the self-deseribed 
eonservative’s population results in a slight deerease in eeonomie initiatives. Insofar as
 ̂ As deseribed in the previous ehapter, the traditionalistie political culture plaees a 
premium on maintaining the social order through eonfinement of political power to an 
elite few. Since the elite are not likely to use the initiative to maintain the status quo, but 
rather to defend it (Gerber 1998), this relationship does make intuitive sense.
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the general notion that conservatives favor less intervention into the marketplace^, this 
relationship seems to make intuitive sense^.
The relationship between state legislative professionalism and the institution of 
direet demoeraey is thus limited. Though the relationship between inereased 
professionalism and increased ballot initiative activity does seem well proven, no 
statistical significance could be determined when the types of initiatives were eonsidered. 
Understanding the nature of this may be easier if  a few “non-events” are considered. In 
other words, by eonsidering what was not found, it may better demonstrate what was 
found.
First, a negative relationship was found neither when considering frequeney only, nor 
when considering type. Had this relationship been diseovered, the original argument 
would have likely been proven true: a more professional legislature is better able to serve 
the needs of its eitizens sinee the eitizenry relies less on the “end-around” tactie of the 
ballot initiative. Secondly, a negative (statistieally significant) relationship was also not 
found between the types o f initiatives; in this case, the similar argument eould be 
presented for that type of initiative. In other words, the argument eould be made that
 ̂The notion that conservatives favor less intervention into the eeonomie markets, while 
widely understood and aeeepted, is far from universally aeeepted by all eonservatives. 
Indeed, this relationship also assumes that the nature of the initiatives is such that 
intervention into the markets is the purpose of the initiative, rather than prohibitions on 
intervention.
 ̂As deseribed in the previous chapter, a control variable for religious attitudes (measured 
as percentage of religious fundamentalism by state) was also included in the model. 
However, beeause of the deereased sample size, a limit on the number of independent 
variables exists. A separate analysis was run (not shown) that replaced this religious 
participation variable with the political culture variable, and another was eonducted 
replaeing the conservatives variable. Neither analysis produeed signifieant changes in the 
model presented here.
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increased legislative professionalism does not neeessarily lead to more eontent eitizens 
when the eeonomie (or social/moral, or governmental process) issues are eoneemed.
Third, no significant changes in neither magnitude nor direction o f the eoeffieient 
occurred between the qualifieation difficulty index and decreased ballot initiatives across 
all types. Finally, the strength and direction o f many of the variables remained constant 
when eonsidering both frequency and type; though statistical significance was not 
achieved, the direetion of the professionalism eoeffieient remained positive. Taken 
together, this may indicate a positive relationship does exist in this model in a similar 
manner to the prior model, but the limited sample size precluded statistical significance.
Regardless, statistieal significance was, at least on some levels, determined. However, 
substantive signifieance within the context of the provided theory should also be 
eonsidered. Returning to the theoretical explanations regarding institutions, four sourees 
of institutional dynamism were identified. Briefly, they were: first, broad ehanges in the 
soeioeeonomie or politieal eontext can produce a situation in which previously latent 
institutions suddenly become salient, with implieations for political outcomes; seeondly, 
ehanges in socioeconomic or political balance of power produees a situation in whieh old 
institutions are put in service of different ends, as new actors come into play who pursue 
their new goals through existing institutions; third, exogenous ehanges ean produce a 
shift in the goals or strategies being pursued within existing institutions: changes in 
outcomes as old actors adopt new goals within the old institutions; and finally, political 
actors adjust their strategies to accommodate ehanges in the institutions themselves.
The results developed here may support the institutionalists’ conception of change 
(through the framework of institutional dynamism outlined above) in more ways than 
one. First, if  inereased legislative professionalism results in increased ballot initiatives, it
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may be the case that this change in the “political balance of power” may have produced a 
situation in which the old institution (the state legislature) was put into service towards 
different ends. As Gerber (1998) explains, interest groups may pursue both direet and 
indirect influence on the state legislature. Indirect influence may mean proposing and 
placing a measure on the ballot that was never intended to pass -  simply having the 
legislature respond to a group’s threat or signals may be enough. Sinee the legislature is 
more likely to be able to respond given inereased professionalism (mainly through 
increased staff and resources, as well as session time), this may be an additional 
explanation of the inereased initiatives.
Seeondly, considering increased legislative professionalism as an exogenous change 
with respect to the institution of direet democracy, sueh professionalization may produee 
a shift in the goals or strategies being pursued within existing institutions. That is, the 
inereased professionalism that likely leads to increased capacity would likely precede a 
shift in the goals of the interest groups involved with the state legislature. The fact that 
the “interest group strength” eoeffieient was both positive and significant in the first 
model supports this notion.
Finally, as outlined by Thelen and Steinmo, politieal actors may adjust their 
strategies to accommodate ehanges in the institutions themselves. In this ease, politieal 
actors may mean organized interest groups, or it may mean short-lived coalitions seeking 
action on one issue; either way, if  the change involved in the equation is inereased 
legislative professionalism, then the adjustment may simply mean an alternative to the 
progressive nature (or conversely, the static nature, given the possibility of a 
“traditionalistic” political culture) through the initiative process. In other words, the 
inereased capacity within the state legislature ean be seen as a threat to the status quo; or
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it may be viewed as a sort of “empty shirt” type institution -  capable of producing but not 
actually producing change. In either ease, the actor’s new action (in the sense that the 
action is a result of increased professionalization) is the initiative -  regardless of intent to 
preserve or change the status quo. This may be supported by the results of the divided 
government variable in the first model: regardless of division or unity, ballot initiatives 
inerease as professionalization inereases. In other words, neither perceived “gridlock” nor 
“streamlining” affects the frequency o f initiatives to the same degree that 
professionalization does. Thus, the theoretical actor who proposes the initiative may not 
be wholly concerned with the capacity of the legislature so mueh as he is eoneemed with 
the actual output, and adjusts his actions accordingly.
Thus, the possible “veto points” eonsidered in ehapter one become slightly clearer: 
conceptual “weaknesses” in the political institutions that structure actors’ decision­
making processes regarding placing an initiative on the ballot may inelude the level of 
professionalization of the state legislature. Although “weakness” as deseribed by Thelen 
and Steinmo (1994) may lack conceptual clarity, the point is nevertheless clear: as 
legislatures professionalize, the relationship between the institutions changes such that 
initiatives appear to be more appealing to actors in the political arena. Additionally, other 
veto points exist: clearly, qualifieation difficulty o f the initiative process strongly predicts 
the frequency o f initiatives appearing on statewide ballots.
Conclusions
This chapter has focused on testing two main hypotheses via statistieal analysis. 
Statistical and substantive significance were found for the first hypothesis, and while 
limited statistical support was found for the seeond hypothesis, the results were
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nonetheless substantive in nature. The results from this model, which has been expanded 
over prior models reviewed in the discipline, confirm many previous findings, adding to 
their robust nature. Moreover, by applying the theoretical framework that focuses on the 
causes o f institutional change within the context of the structure of the institutions 
themselves, this chapter has provided additional explanations regarding the frequency 
and type o f statewide initiatives appearing on statewide ballots. The concluding chapter 
will discuss this notion in the larger context o f direct democracy as developed in chapter 
two.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The study of direct democracy in America has received considerable attention by 
scholars over the last few decades. The nature of these works has generally been 
outcome oriented; in other words, attention has focused primarily on the factors that 
contribute to certain initiatives having success on the ballot. For example, the role of 
interest groups, and in particular, their background, power, and ability mobilize resources 
has been the focus o f many scholars. Indeed, with regards to interest groups, a eonsensus 
among scholars exists; broad-based interest groups have considerably more success in 
passing initiatives that modify the status quo, while narrow material interest groups, such 
as trial lawyer associations, are more successful in countering initiatives. Moreover, 
scholars have found that initiatives that threaten minority rights are more likely to be 
successful in areas where the eleetorate is considered to be more homogeneous than 
usual, or in municipalities where the electorate as a whole is smaller. Still focusing on 
outcomes, other scholars have determined that economic initiatives are more likely to fail 
when the overall economic trends are considered negative.
The focus on outcomes, and thus, on direct democracy as a policy-making institution, 
is a worthwhile pursuit. However, this thesis contributes to the diseipline by first 
considering the expectations of the “founders” of direct democracy, the viability of those 
expectations, and then by considering how those expeetations have (or have not) been
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realized by today’s practitioners. The work presented here is designed to be viewed 
alongside the outeome-oriented literature, rather than as a work that is eritieal or 
supportive of such literature. The current ehapter seeks to synthesize this thesis, and 
discuss its overall eontribution to the discipline.
Discussion
State legislatures are professionalizing. As discussed in the first ehapter, the 
consequences o f this professionalization are numerous: increased professionalization is 
found to be correlated with increased public contact with representatives, inereases in 
legislator diversity, and increased autonomy in initiating policies. As legislatures 
professionalize, institutional changes occur that force other actors in the political arena to 
adopt new strategies. In particular, interest groups that seek to either change or maintain 
the status quo may need to consider using the initiative to aehieve policy success rather 
than focus on a state legislature that has developed inereased autonomy. At the same 
time, citizens who find themselves living in a state with the initiative available to them 
may be able to quiekly and decisively remedy what is pereeived to be an over-aetive, or 
under-aetive, state legislature. These policies may have the added effeet of not only 
affecting policy, but of affecting how policies are made by the state legislators 
themselves. For example, an eleetorate who sueeessfully passes tax-and-expenditure 
limitations are, in a sense, removing much of the autonomy that was available to the 
government. Sueh broad-based movements on the part of the eitizens lack much of the 
deliberation and foresight that would oeeur among (hopefully) seasoned lawmakers; but 
at the same time, they also come without sueh things as log-rolling maneuvers by state
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legislators. At the same time, their intent is to prevent future baek-room deal-making by 
state legislators, by instrueting the institution on what it exactly can and cannot do.
The notion that the people, at least in initiative states, are able to retain the authority 
to pass laws that restriet the movements of those that they have eleeted to represent them 
is elearly within line of the expeetations of both the Populists and the Progressives who 
founded this movement a eentury ago. Intent on eschewing party polities, these groups 
sought to return authority to the people -  and there is hardly a better test of authority of 
the people than the ability to direetly eontrol those who govern. Devoid of sueh Populist 
notions as attempts to replace representative government with direct democracy, the 
institution has enjoyed considerable popularity. Moreover, the societal problems left in 
the wake of the Industrial Revolution -  a major catalyst in the induetion of direet 
demoeraey as an institution -  had the ability to be addressed by direct democracy. While 
the Progressives’ intent was for the soeietal problems to be solved, this may have been 
overreaehing; solving problems is not always the goal of government’, insofar as solving 
requires the ability to know preeisely how polieies are going to affect different groups in 
the future^. However, dealing with problems should be at least one of the functions of 
government, and in this way, the Progressive notion has been realized -  at least within 
states that have the initiative process available to them. As the statistical analysis in the 
last chapter showed, the eoncept o f “dealing with problems” is also a function of political 
culture: given states with different eultures, those in the traditionalistic culture are less 
likely to consider the initiative than are those in moralistic states. Thus, the institution has
’ The term “government” in this sense refers to the notion of the people using plebiseitary 
methods to govern.
 ̂As Danish physieist Niels Bohr points out, “predietion is very difficult, especially about 
the future.”
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progressed from a method of returning authority to the people in terms of the 
governmental process to one of maintaining and reserving authority to the people in 
terms of the governmental process.
Limitations of the Study/Areas for Future Research 
The work presented here has extended the work of other scholars by utilizing 
different control variables and operationalization methods, as well as surveying different 
time periods. For the most part, the results of this study confirm the results of prior 
studies. Few studies are free from limitations, and this study is not immune. First, as the 
analysis developed, the sample size decreased considerably. This was due in part to the 
exclusion of Nebraska and Illinois from both models, and Alaska from the second model. 
Thus, this study could benefit from an increased sample by extending the years in 
initiatives appeared on statewide ballots.
Secondly, the secondary model that considered the type of initiative may not have 
been fully specified. In other words, because the emphasis diverged from simple 
frequency analysis to type o f initiative, other factors may need to be considered in order 
to fully understand the causes o f variance. In particular, as LeLoup (1978) argues, 
legislative professionalism does not automatically equate to legislative capacity. Because 
of this, future research may consider the types of legislation considered by the legislature 
in the context of state-level public opinion. This variable may better able to predict the 
type of initiatives appearing on statewide ballots as a better predictor of dissatisfaction 
with the policies emanating from the state legislature. However, a recurring problem in 
state-level analysis is the notion that public opinion may vary widely across states; 
California and Nevada are prime examples of this phenomena.
IIS
Third, this study may have benefited from an expanded analysis of state legislative 
professionalism. That is, this thesis has considered only those states that have the 
initiative process available, and the corresponding state levels of legislative 
professionalism. By evaluating states that do not have the initiative available to them, as 
well as the corresponding levels of state legislative professionalism, a broader pattern 
may have emerged showing that highly professional legislatures were more common in 
states that did not have the process, thereby suggesting that these states did not sense a 
need to circumvent the legislature. Though proper control variables would have to be 
considered, such a finding could cast doubt on the notion that legislative professionalism 
is universally associated with increased ballot initiative activity.
Finally, future researchers would do well to consider, in addition to the type of 
initiatives considered on statewide ballots, whether or not the initiative modifies or 
maintains the status quo. As legislatures professionalize, divergences in public opinion 
regarding the (perceived) increases in output may result in differences in the objective of 
initiatives that are not captured with a simple measure of type. Understanding the 
correlation between legislative professionalism, the type of initiatives passed in a given 
state, as well as whether or not the initiatives maintained or altered the status quo, would 
increase our overall understanding of the relationship between the institution of the state 
legislatures and direct democracy.
Conclusions
The current study has considered the institution of direct democracy in a broad, 
comparative sense in order to gain insight into the overall status of the institution, as
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compared with the genesis of the institution itself. In so doing, the study has produced a 
number o f contributions to the discipline.
First, analysis o f the literature suggests that the expectations o f the founders o f direct 
democracy regarding the educative effects o f the institution may not have been met. In 
arguing that direct democracy would enhance citizen engagement, political knowledge, as 
well as heighten the political efficacy o f the citizenry, the Progressives may have been 
overly dependent upon the institution as an instigating force in producing the results 
without fully considering the desires of the citizens themselves. The process of direct 
democracy cannot, in and o f itself, automatically produce changes in the citizenry. 
Though the institution may give the opportunity for the citizens to become more engaged 
and knowledgeable, the outcome is still up to the people and their choice to take the 
action necessary to become more engaged and knowledgeable.
Secondly, broad examinations of the literature regarding interest groups and direct 
democracy show distinctive patterns. First, interest group activity increases in states that 
allow direct democracy. Secondly, broad-based interest groups often have more success 
at placing initiatives on the ballots, while narrow-material interest groups often have 
more success at defeating ballot initiatives. Thus, the notion of the Progressives that 
direct democracy would be able to “neutralize” the power o f special-interest influence 
over the policymaking process (and primarily over the state legislature) has also not been 
met. However, this may once again be a case of overreaching on the part o f the 
Progressives. The belief that interest groups may be co-opting the policymaking process 
is often a function of the beholder’s beliefs. Thus, the Progressive notion that interest 
groups should not be able to exert influence over the policymaking process may have 
largely stemmed from a belief that their own interests were not largely represented by
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powerful interest groups. Indeed, by organizing initial groups with the purpose of 
instituting functions such as direct democracy (e.g., the Farmer’s Alliance), Populists and 
Progressives were, in many ways, creating an interest group focused on breaking the 
power of other interest groups. Ideally, the Progressive notion could have been limited to 
increasing the openness or transparency of the process (and direct democracy could still 
have been a method of achieving this) in an effort to increase the plurality of interest 
groups. This o f course, lacks the panache o f a platform calling for the destruction of 
“powerful special interest pressure groups” and would have likely resulted in fewer 
followers.
Third, the literature considering policy outcomes and direct democracy has revealed 
that, for the most part, policies in states with the initiative are more in line with the public 
opinion than those in non-initiative states. Moreover, studies reveal that minority rights 
are rarely (though not never) infringed upon through the process of direct democracy. 
This relationship, however, does not hold in municipal-level elections. Though the 
expectations o f the founders o f direct democracy are not widely articulated on these 
issues, it seems clear that these outcomes are, in the least, not contradictory.
Fourth, the statistical analyses presented here show that increased legislative 
professionalism, in terms of staff, compensation, and session time, are associated with 
increased initiative activity, when holding other factors, such as qualification difficulty 
and interest group strength, constant. Thus, the study supports previous findings, as well 
as their explanations, that the relationship may be a function of increased policy agendas 
within more professional legislatures, as well as a function of the relationship between 
interest groups and state legislators.
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Finally, this thesis suggests that the relationship between direct democracy and state 
legislatures may be well informed by the institutionalist theory. More specifically, the 
theoretical expectations o f institutional dynamism suggest that veto points occur within 
the institutions that populate the political arena, and that (rational) political actors attempt 
to pursue their own agenda by exploiting these veto points. Considering individuals or 
groups attempting to place initiatives on the ballot as the rational actors pursuing goals, 
such veto points may become apparent at different levels of legislative professionalism 
across states, especially within the context of other variables, such as qualification 
difficulty, divided government situations, and differences in the economic conditions or 
public opinion regarding a particular policy. These components, occurring together but 
necessarily in tandem, function as considerations to individuals or groups considering an 
initiative, and ultimately, serve as explanatory predictors of changes via direct 
democracy.
In conclusion, untangling the complications and paradoxes involved in the study of 
direct democracy is far from complete. The institution is capable of aggregating citizen 
policy desires into actual policies, and as such, may be beneficial to the overall political 
process. While the long-term implications of many policies (such as tax-and-expenditure 
limitations) may be questioned, especially in terms of overall school funding levels and 
other social programs, the wishes of the majority of the (voting) population are still the 
deciding factor in lawmaking in America. Assuming that participation includes a majority 
of the population, however, is another consideration entirely.
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APPENDIX I
Categorization o f Initiatives
NCSL’S Designation: New Category:
Agriculture
Banking and Financial Services 
Budget and Tax -  Federal 
Budgets -  State
Commerce and Economic Development 
Energy and Electric Utilities 
Gambling and Lotteries 
Insurance
Labor and Employment 
Telecom and Info Tech 
Transportation
(1) Economic Issues
Arts and Culture
Civil and Constitutional Law
Criminal Justice
Education
Environmental Protection 
Health
Human Services 
Juvenile Justice 
Natural Resources
(2) Social/Moral Initiatives
Elections and Redistricting
Federalism
Judiciary
Legislatures
State and Local Government 
Tax and Revenue -  State
(3) Governmental Process Initiatives
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APPENDIX II
Coding o f Religious Denominations
ARIS Designation New Category:
Assemblies of God 
Apostolic Faith 
Baptist
Church o f Christ 
Church o f God 
Pentecostal
(1) Evangelical
Congregationalist
Methodist
Episcopalian
Disciples of Christ
Unitarian/Universalist
Protestant
Presbyterian
American Lutheran Church 
Lutheran Church in America
(2) Mainline
No Religion
Buddhist
Refused
Jehovah’s Witness
Mormon/LDS
Other
Jewish
Nondenominational
Muslim/Islamic
Not Coded
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